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ABSTRACT

RUMINATIVE RESOLUTION OF TRAUMA COGNITIONS:
MODES OF PROCESSING IN AN ANALOGUE STUDY
Christine E. Valdez, Ph.D.
Department of Psychology
Northern Illinois University, 2015
Michelle M. Lilly, Director
Rumination is conceptualized as a trans-diagnostic process that involves
disorder-specific content, and has only recently begun to be explored in posttraumatic
stress. The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of “analytic” rumination
and “concrete” rumination on analogue PTSD symptoms. Women who experienced
assaultive violence (N = 63) were randomly assigned to a concrete rumination, analytic
rumination, or control condition. Baseline symptoms were assessed with measures of
anxiety and negative affectivity (NA), and a thought listing procedure. After, women
underwent a rumination induction, then participated in a trauma-specific perseverative
thinking interview to process their trauma and identify trauma beliefs. Finally, women
completed post-processing symptom assessments. Results revealed that anxiety, NA,
and trauma intrusions increased after the trauma-specific perseverative thinking
interview, though these increases did not differ by condition. Also, problematic trauma
beliefs did not differ among conditions, though post-hoc analyses revealed that
accommodated trauma beliefs were significantly higher among concrete ruminators
than analytic ruminators. In analytic ruminators, problematic trauma beliefs were
positively associated with anxiety and NA after trauma processing, and anxiety and NA

were positively associated with trauma intrusions. As a whole, the hypothesized
mediation models in this study were not supported. Implications for research, theory,
and practice are discussed.
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PREFACE
Posttraumatic stress symptoms are a very common experience and a typical
reaction in the immediate aftermath of a traumatic event, but the majority of individuals
exposed to trauma are able to resolve these symptoms within several weeks.
Nevertheless, a significant minority of individuals continue to experience posttraumatic
stress symptoms beyond a one-month period and continue to meet diagnostic criteria for
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) months, and even years, after a traumatic event.
Researchers and clinicians are continuing to recognize that avoidance of trauma-related
stimuli may be a crucial mechanism by which posttraumatic stress is maintained. That is
the reason for engaging with the memory of the traumatic event(s) and reappraising
dysfunctional trauma cognitions, which is inherent in several treatment approaches for
PTSD. Yet, research is beginning to identify that thinking about and appraising
emotionally laden information is not always an effective strategy. Some trauma
survivors may become “stuck” in their trauma appraisals and assimilate and/or overaccommodate their trauma beliefs, and they may selectively recall the traumatic event
in a way that is biased by their appraisals. This form of appraisal, thinking about the
causes and/or consequences of the trauma, may directly produce negative emotions and
a sense of perceived threat, maintaining the posttraumatic stress syndrome. Thus, some
methods of appraising the trauma may be characteristic of ineffective ruminative forms
of thought control that have been shown to have a large effect size in predicting various
forms of psychopathology.

x
One area of research that has been particularly active in investigating ruminative
processes comes from the depression literature and concerns theories of ruminative
depression. Depression theorists have conceptualized effective appraisal as a selfreflective, “mindful experiencing/being” process characterized by nonevaluative
experiential awareness of thoughts and emotions from moment to moment, and have
labeled this strategy as concrete rumination. Ineffective appraisal is a brooding,
“conceptualizing/doing” process in which an individual tries to analyze and make sense
of thoughts or emotions in a way that can strengthen problematic appraisals and
maintain distress. This strategy has been labeled as analytic rumination. With regard to
PTSD, analytic rumination can serve a cognitive avoidance function used by individuals
to control perceived threat by analyzing the causes and/or consequences of the traumatic
event, without thinking about the traumatic event itself and building a complete trauma
narrative that can aid in emotionally processing the experience. Thus, analytic
rumination may ultimately inhibit the ability to deploy adaptive coping strategies and
may interfere with the natural recovery process in PTSD. However, little research has
specifically examined ruminative processes in the context of PTSD, and no research has
explored whether these two constructs (i.e., analytic and concrete rumination) are
relevant to PTSD, which could have implications for the way in which PTSD is
conceptualized and treated.
This study examines whether anxiety, negative affectivity, and trauma intrusions
increase after a trauma-specific perseverative thinking task and whether problematic
(i.e., assimilated and over-accommodated) trauma beliefs expressed during the trauma-

xi
specific perseverative thinking interview are associated with the increases in anxiety,
negative affectivity, and trauma intrusions. Additionally, this study explores whether
induced analytic rumination results in greater problematic trauma beliefs compared to
induced concrete rumination and whether anxiety and negative affectivity mediate the
relation between problematic trauma beliefs and trauma intrusions.

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) can develop after experiencing a
traumatic event, such as a severe accident, assault, disaster, combat exposure, or the
sudden and unexpected death of a loved one. PTSD has been defined as an anxiety
disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-Fourth EditionText Revision (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2000), characterized by
three symptom clusters: reexperiencing the traumatic event (Criterion B); avoidance of
thoughts, acts, or situations associated with the traumatic event, and numbing of general
responsiveness (Criterion C); and hyperarousal (Criterion D). These symptoms need to
be present for at least one month (Criterion E) and accompanied by significant distress
or impairment (Criterion F) to constitute a diagnosis of PTSD subsequent to a traumatic
event (Criterion A1) that induces intense fear, helplessness, or horror (Criterion A2). In
addition, many individuals exposed to trauma develop negative cognitions about the
world, self, and others, as well as negative emotions (DePrince, Zurbriggen, Chu, &
Smart, 2010; Foa, Ehlers, Clark, Tolin, & Orsillo, 1999; Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Sobel,
Resick, & Rabalais, 2009). In the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders-Fifth Edition (DSM-V), which was recently released (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013), slight alterations were be made to the reexperiencing, avoidance,
and hyperarousal symptom clusters to increase specificity and make them more
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applicable across cultures, and a new cluster of symptoms was included, characterized
by altered cognitions and emotions associated with trauma exposure.
Many people experience at least some of these symptoms subsequent to a
traumatic event (Riggs, Rothbaum, & Foa, 1995; Rothbaum et al., 1992), but a
significant proportion of individuals recover in the following weeks or months (Brewin,
Andrews, & Valentine, 2000; McFarlane, 1998). For example, Rothbaum et al. (1992)
found that 94% of rape victims met symptomatic criteria for PTSD within 30 days after
a sexual assault, which decreased to 47% at 12 weeks after the initial study interview.
Posttraumatic stress symptoms decreased sharply between the initial interview and 35
days later. Symptoms persisted throughout the three-month study for women who did
not show improvement at the 35-day post-baseline interview benchmark, indicating that
there is a sizeable proportion of individuals whose symptoms persist, often for years.
Breslau et al. (1998) estimate that approximately 60% of people with PTSD report no
remission by 12 months and more than 33% of PTSD cases persist for more than 60
months. These observations have led to the conceptualization of PTSD as a disorder of
non-recovery (Resick & Schnicke, 1996).
Epidemiology of PTSD
It has been estimated that PTSD affects approximately one in 12 adults at some
point in their lives, and an estimated 15% to 25% of individuals who have been exposed
to one or more traumatic events (Breslau, 2001). In the National Comorbidity Survey
(NCS), a nationally representative sample of 5,877 individuals aged 15 to 54 living
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within 48 states of the U.S., the rate of exposure to at least one traumatic event was
61%, and the estimated lifetime prevalence of PTSD was 7.8% (Kessler et al., 1995).
The 7.8% lifetime prevalence rate in the NCS is consistent with a PTSD lifetime
prevalence rate of 6.8% in the National Comorbidity Survey- Replication (NCS-R),
another nationally representative sample of 9,828 U.S. adults (PTSD was assessed in
5,692 participants) assessing psychiatric disorders based on DSM-IV diagnostic criteria
(Kessler et al., 2005).
The Detroit Area Survey of Trauma (DAST), a community-based survey of
2,181 individuals aged 18 to 45 living in the Detroit, Michigan, area, showed that the
lifetime prevalence for exposure to one or more traumas was 89.6%, and the conditional
risk of PTSD based on the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria was 9.2% (Breslau et al., 1998).
The conditional risk for PTSD is defined here as the probability of developing PTSD
given that an individual has been exposed to one or more traumatic events. Resnick,
Kilpatrick, Dansky, Saunders, and Best (1993) demonstrated that the rates of PTSD
among crime victims (26%) are much higher than among survivors of other types of
non-criminal trauma (9%). Indeed, in the DAST, the conditional risk for PTSD
increased substantially when considering interpersonal forms of trauma (i.e., traumas
that were inflicted by another human being). For instance, assaultive violence accounted
for 40% of PTSD cases (Breslau et al., 1998). This 40% conditional risk is similar to
that found by NCS: the highest conditional risk was associated with rape (65% for men,
47% of men), and in fact, sexual violence accounted for almost half of the cases of
PTSD among women (Kessler et al., 1995). Overall, the disparity between lifetime
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prevalence of exposure to a traumatic event and lifetime prevalence of PTSD suggests
that there may be systematic factors that increase risk for developing the disorder
subsequent to a traumatic event.
Phenomenology of PTSD
PTSD is a complex phenomenon represented by a broad array of overt and
covert behaviors. For example, individuals with PTSD show altered cognitions in
response to trauma, including assimilated (e.g., “I did something to cause the traumatic
event”) and overaccommodated (e.g., “The world is entirely dangerous”) beliefs
(Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Resick & Schnicke, 1996). These cognitions are very often
accompanied by a range of strong negative emotions, such as anger (Foa, Riggs,
Massie, & Yarczower, 1995), and guilt, shame, disgust, and sadness (Andrews, Brewin,
Rose, & Kirk, 2000; DePrince et al., 2010; Grey, Holmes, & Brewin, 2001; Reynolds &
Brewin, 1998). Clinicians and researchers have also recognized that trauma narratives
are frequently fragmented and disorganized (Amir, Stafford, Freshman, & Foa, 1998;
Foa, Molnar, & Cashman, 1995; Tromp, Koss, Figueredo, & Tharan, 1995).
Furthermore, the clinical picture is often complicated by associated features of
dissociation, alterations in personality, affect dysregulation, and impairment in intimacy
and attachment, particularly for survivors of chronic, interpersonal traumas (Herman,
1992), in addition to comorbid psychological disorders (Kessler et al., 1995) and
physical health complaints (Schnurr, Green, & Kaltman, 2007). Thus, PTSD is a
multifaceted disorder that manifests in cognitive, affective, behavioral, and
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physiological responses. The core PTSD syndrome involves 17 symptoms categorized
into three symptom clusters. "
Reexperiencing (Criterion B)
Reexperiencing symptoms includes intrusive thoughts, images, and nightmares
of the traumatic event; increased mental and/or physiological distress when reminded of
the event; and flashbacks in which individuals believe that they are reliving the event in
the present. Some theorists propose that some of these symptoms are part of the natural
recovery process following a traumatic event as a way to incorporate the trauma into
preexisting beliefs (Horowitz, 1986). A traumatic event can “shatter” optimistic
assumptions about the world, others, and the self (Janoff-Bulman, 1992) or it can
strengthen preexisting negative assumptions (Foa, & Rothbaum, 1998). Horowitz
(1986) suggests that people have a basic need to match trauma-related information with
their schemas through repetitive revision until both sources are congruent, which he
termed the “completion tendency.” This process can be achieved via assimilation (i.e.,
altering new information to match prior beliefs), over-accommodation (i.e., altering
beliefs to the extreme to feel safe and in control), and accommodation (i.e., altering
beliefs to incorporate new information).
Additionally, it is proposed that a traumatic event produces a mental fear
network that includes stimuli, responses, and meaning elements associated with the
traumatic event (Foa & Kozak, 1986; Foa, Steketee, & Rothbaum, 1989). The mental
fear network is thought to be stable and broadly generalized; thus, it is easily accessed.
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Reminders of the traumatic event (e.g., people, places, certain emotions, physiological
sensations) activate the mental fear network and allow trauma memories into conscious
awareness, promoting reexperiencing symptoms. Foa and Rothbaum (1998) elaborated
on the original network theory proposed by Foa and Kozak (1986) to incorporate the
idea of schematic representations to account for the generalized stimulus-danger
associations observed in trauma narratives. That is, many stimuli in the world become
associated with danger, and abstracted meanings emerge in the form of schemas.
Hyperarousal (Criterion D)
Hyperarousal symptoms are defined by difficulty falling asleep, staying asleep,
and concentrating; irritability; hypervigilance; and exaggerated startle response. Major
and/or persistent psychological trauma can alter autonomic nervous-system functioning
and result in a sensitive stress circuit (van der Kolk, 2001) that may lead to hyperarousal
symptoms. After a traumatic event, or series of traumatic experiences, the state of
hyperarousal may be triggered by stimuli represented in the mental fear network. For
example, one study found that individuals with PTSD exhibited greater autonomic
responses during the writing of trauma flashback accounts than of ordinary memories
(Hellawell & Brewin, 2002).

Avoidance and Numbing (Criterion C)
The avoidance and numbing symptom cluster of PTSD includes efforts to avoid
thoughts, feelings, conversations, activities, places, or people associated with the
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trauma; inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma; diminished interest in
significant activities; feelings of detachment, or estrangement from others; restricted
range of affect; and a sense of a foreshortened future. Although not a DSM-IV-TR
defined symptom cluster of PTSD, research has demonstrated that numbing reactions
are a distinct construct from the avoidance symptoms of PTSD, as they load on a
different factor than that of avoidance symptoms (e.g., Asmundson, Stapleton, &
Taylor, 2004). Emotional numbing is theorized to represent an emotional analgesia that
prevents response to stimuli represented in the mental fear network (Feuer, Nishith, &
Resick, 2005).
Avoidance involves a more strategic, effortful process aimed at coping with
triggers in the mental fear network that may elicit intrusive memories of the traumatic
event and other reexperiencing symptoms. However, attempts to avoid unwanted
intrusions actually increase their frequency of occurrence, which is termed the “rebound
effect” (Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987). Thus, individuals suppressing
thoughts associated with a traumatic event might actually experience an increase in
intrusions of these thoughts, paradoxically maintaining reexperiencing symptoms and
emotional reactions to the traumatic experience (Beck, Gudmundsdottir, Palyo, Miller,
& Grant, 2006). This increase in intrusions may result in further attempts to avoid
traumatic intrusions, which intensify vulnerable emotions, as well as attempts to numb
such strong emotional reactions, defining the posttraumatic stress syndrome. Therefore,
experiential avoidance (i.e., an unwillingness to stay in contact with internal states by
attempting to suppress unwanted emotions, thoughts, and bodily sensations) may be one
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mechanism by which PTSD symptoms are maintained. In fact, experiential avoidance
has long been recognized as playing a central role in a variety of emotional disorders
(Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl, 1996).
Posttraumatic Stress Maintenance
A number of factors appear to determine the course, severity, and nature of
posttraumatic sequelae (Hembree et al., 2003; Ozer, Best, Lipsey, & Weiss, 2003),
which can be categorized into pre-trauma factors, peritraumatic factors, and post-trauma
factors. The focus of this study is on post-trauma factors and maintenance of
posttraumatic stress symptoms. Ehlers and Clark (2000) propose that posttraumatic
stress symptoms can persist if one processes the traumatic event or its sequelae in a way
that produces a sense of current threat. They suggest that a fragmented and poorly
elaborated trauma memory (i.e., disorganized processing of the trauma memory) can
lead to the perception that the trauma is happening in the present rather than the past.
Additionally, erroneous beliefs about the causes and consequences of the traumatic
event can have negative implications for the future (e.g., the world and others are
perceived as entirely dangerous) and the trauma can subsequently be seen as a timeunlimited event. These features of posttraumatic sequelae can maintain PTSD by
directly producing negative emotions and motivating a series of avoidant behavioral and
cognitive responses that are intended to reduce perceived threat and distress in the
short-term. However, coping strategies aimed at avoiding trauma-related stimuli prevent
emotional processing and have the paradoxical effect of enhancing reexperiencing
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symptoms (Wegner et al., 1987; Wegner, Shortt, Blake, & Page, 1990), maintaining the
disorder in the long-run.
Several cognitive strategies to control intrusive or unwanted thoughts have been
identified in the literature (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994; Wells & Davies, 1994). Some
have been considered either effective (i.e., social control, reappraisal, distraction;
Bryant, Moulds, & Guthrie, 2001; Reynolds & Wells, 1999). Others have considered
ineffective (i.e., thought suppression, worry, punishment; Amstadter & Vernon, 2006;
Beck et al., 2006; Bennett, Beck, & Clapp, 2009; Holeva, Tarrier, & Wells, 2001;
Shipherd & Beck, 1999, 2005; Warda & Bryant, 1998).
Contrary to expectations, two recent studies (Scarpa, Wilson, Wells, Patriquin,
& Tanaka, 2009; Valdez, & Lilly, 2012) have identified the cognitive strategy of
reappraisal from the Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ; Wells & Davies, 1994) to
be associated with increased posttraumatic stress in victims of interpersonal trauma.
Valdez and Lilly (2012) further examined this relation and found that reappraisal was
positively associated with both effective and ineffective thought-control strategies. For
example, items such as “I focus on the thought” and “I question the reasons for having
the thought” may represent ineffective strategies if the individual is replaying the
intrusive traumatic thought or assigning self-blame to the traumatic thought. However,
these items could also suggest that the individual is trying to engage with the thought in
ways that could help one reprocess the traumatic event and lead to better post-trauma
recovery. Thus, some aspects of the reappraisal construct, as represented by the TCQ,
may capture ineffective ruminative forms of thought control that have been shown to
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have a large effect size in predicting various forms of psychopathology (Aldao, NolenHoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010). Indeed, theorists are beginning to argue integrating
rumination as a cognitive vulnerability maintenance factor in models of PTSD (e.g.,
Elwood, Hahn, Olatunji, & Williams, 2009).
Trauma-Related Rumination
Rumination is a multifaceted construct; it is described as a way of responding to
distress that involves thinking repetitively and passively about symptoms of distress,
thinking about the meaning of the distress, and thinking about precipitators of negative
events (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). It may be used to avoid physical and emotional
reactions towards unpleasant and anxiety-provoking experiences, but it may connect
these experiences to many other stimuli, thereby enhancing their accessibility in
memory networks. It differs conceptually from worry, another ineffective cognitive
strategy identified in the literature (Reynolds & Wells, 1999; Wells & Davies, 1994), as
the content of thoughts in worry are future-oriented whereas they are past-oriented in
rumination. Although they do share the commonality of repetitive thought, items of
rumination and worry have been observed to load on different factors (Fresco, Frankel,
Mennin, Turk, & Heimberg, 2002).
Rumination has also been conceptually differentiated from related constructs,
such as negative automatic thoughts, private self-consciousness, self-focused attention,
intrusive thoughts, and obsessions (for a review, see Smith & Alloy, 2009). The Ehlers
and Clark (2000) cognitive model of PTSD suggests that rumination about the causes
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and/or consequences of the trauma, without thinking about the trauma itself, is a
maintaining factor in PTSD by strengthening problematic trauma appraisals, interfering
with the formation of a complete trauma memory, and/or providing internal retrieval
cues for intrusive memories. Thus, rumination serves a cognitive avoidance function
used by individuals to control perceived threat, but may ultimately inhibit the ability to
deploy adaptive coping strategies and may interfere with the natural recovery process in
PTSD.
Although there is theoretical speculation of the role of rumination in PTSD,
relatively little is known about trauma-related rumination. Nolen-Hoeksema and
Morrow (1991) conducted the first longitudinal study on rumination and PTSD
symptoms in a sample of individuals before and after being exposed to a natural
disaster. They found that participants who, before the natural disaster had a ruminative
response style, showed higher levels of PTSD symptoms in the 10 days after the natural
disaster compared to those participants with a less ruminative response style. In the first
10 days after the natural disaster, participants who often thought about the moment the
natural disaster occurred, their feelings around the time of the natural disaster, and the
injuries caused to other people, showed more PTSD symptoms seven weeks later.
One research team headed by Anke Ehlers, one of the developers of the
cognitive model of PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000), has been particularly active in
researching rumination in trauma survivors. However, most studies by Ehlers and
colleagues examining trauma-related rumination have used only one to six self-report
items to assess a complex phenomenon. In the first study, Steil and Ehlers (2000)
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demonstrated that individuals who avoided trauma reminders were more likely to
endorse “I ruminate about them” in response to intrusions. Rumination, as represented
by this one question, significantly predicted PTSD symptom severity after controlling
for the effects of avoidance symptoms. In a longitudinal study, they found that the
frequency of rumination, measured by two items (i.e., dwelling on memories of the
trauma, questioning the reasons for the trauma) three months after the traumatic event,
predicted PTSD symptoms one year later. A three-year follow-up found that frequency
of rumination continued to predict PTSD symptoms (Mayou, Ehlers, & Bryant, 2002).
The frequency of rumination has prospectively predicted PTSD symptoms three and six
months post-baseline in a sample of children and adolescents as well (Ehlers, Mayou, &
Bryant, 2003). Steil and Ehlers (2000) found that items addressing thoughts about
permanent change (e.g., “My life is ruined”), justice (e.g., “Others have harmed me”),
personal responsibility (e.g., “It is my fault”), and future danger (e.g., “It will happen
again”) explained 29% of the variance in rumination, illuminating some potential
ruminative content in trauma survivors.
In response to these observations, Clohessy and Ehlers (1999) developed the
Response to Intrusions Questionnaire (RIQ), which incorporates three items designed to
tap into rumination as a response to intrusions (“I dwell on them,” “I worry that
something like that could happen to me or my family,” and “I think about what I could
have done differently”), which they piloted in a sample of ambulance service workers.
They found that rumination was correlated with PTSD symptoms, but internal
consistency for the three items assessing rumination was low (α = .31). It may be that
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these three items tap into other constructs such as worry, or it may be that these three
items were not able to fully capture the complex phenomenon of rumination.
Murray, Ehlers, and Mayou (2002) again used an adapted version of the
rumination subscale of the RIQ and measured rumination and posttraumatic stress
severity prospectively. They found that both initial and persistent rumination at four
weeks were strong predictors of PTSD symptoms at six months. In this study, the
revised questionnaire consisted of six items, such as “Do you go over what happened
again and again?” and “Do you dwell on what happened, without really solving or
deciding anything?” Although reliability increased with six items, it was still relatively
low in two samples (α = .62 and .77). It may be that these six items were tapping
different dimensions of rumination. For example, the item that asks “Do you go over
what happened again and again?” may represent an effective cognitive strategy that
allows an individual to construct a complete trauma narrative, but could also represent
an ineffective strategy if one is trying to understand the causes of the event.
Other studies purporting to assess rumination in relation to PTSD (e.g., Ehring,
Ehlers, & Glucksman, 2006; Kleim, Ehlers, & Glucksman, 2007) have been confounded
by their use of the total score of the RIQ measure. This measure assesses other cognitive
strategies such as thought suppression, a different construct from rumination.
More recently, Ehlers and colleagues have begun to devise ways to assess
trauma-related rumination that goes beyond the use of a total self-report rumination
frequency score. For example, Michael, Halligan, Clark, and Ehlers (2007) created a
rumination interview designed to assess descriptive information about rumination (e.g.,
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how much time spent ruminating), associations between rumination and psychological
symptoms, meta-cognitive assumptions about ruminating, and six Likert-scale items to
assess ruminative content. Rumination was evident in up to 94% of participants with
PTSD. Participants with PTSD spent significantly more time ruminating than trauma
survivors who did not qualify for a diagnosis of PTSD. More PTSD-positive
participants reported that rumination triggered intrusive memories of the trauma
compared to PTSD-negative participants. Compulsions to continue ruminating,
occurrence of “why” and “what if” types of questions during rumination, occurrence of
unproductive thoughts during rumination, negative feelings before ruminating, and
negative feelings after ruminating were all associated with increased PTSD symptom
severity at initial assessment and six months later. In another study, negative mood and
intrusive memories about a non-traumatic negative life event were maintained after an
induced rumination task, whereas induced distraction resulted in symptom reduction
(Ehring, Fuchs, & Kläsener, 2009), suggesting that rumination interferes with effective
emotional processing, at least in the case of non-traumatic life events.
In summary, until relatively recently, little research has been conducted on
rumination in the context of PTSD. This research was a direct response to the Ehlers
and Clark (2000) cognitive model of PTSD and has been conducted by only
circumscribed group of researchers. This highlights the fact that researchers and
clinicians still do not know much about trauma-related ruminative content or the
mechanisms by which rumination prevents or promotes recovery from PTSD. However,
ample research examines the role of rumination in other emotional disorders,

15
particularly depression, a disorder highly comorbid with PTSD. Some estimates
demonstrate that, of those with a current diagnosis of PTSD, up to 77% qualify for an
additional diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder (Brown, Campbell, Lehman,
Grisham, & Mancill, 2001). Therefore, an examination of rumination theories from the
depression literature may illuminate some of the ruminative mechanisms relevant to the
maintenance of PTSD.
Rumination: Theories from Depression
The most prolific theory of depressive rumination is the Response Styles Theory
(RST) proposed by Nolen-Hoeksema (1991). RST defines rumination as the process of
thinking perseveratively about one’s symptoms of depression and possible
consequences of these symptoms. Depressive ruminators may entertain such thoughts as
“What’s wrong with me?” or “I won’t ever get over this.” The theory does not address
the cause of a depressed state; rather, it focuses on factors that maintain and prolong
depressive symptoms. According to RST, depressive rumination exacerbates and
prolongs distress, increasing the likelihood that symptoms will become chronic. Several
mechanisms by which rumination may prolong depression have been proposed (NolenHoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). First, rumination promotes the use of
negative thinking about past, present, and future events, contributing to increases in
hopelessness and/or helplessness, thereby enhancing depressed mood. Second,
rumination may prompt appraisals of problems as being overwhelming and unsolvable
(e.g., “I can’t do anything to change my situation”), ultimately interfering with effective
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problem solving and creating a cycle of self-defeat. Third, rumination saps motivation
and initiative to engage in behavior that can change one’s situation or mood (e.g., “I
don’t want to even try to change my situation”), prolonging symptoms of dysphoria.
Fourth, chronic ruminators may lose social support as their friends and family members
become frustrated with their perseverative negative thinking style, which may
exacerbate feelings of loneliness and symptoms of depression.
Alloy et al. (2000) extended the RST to incorporate the concept of stressreactive rumination to refer to the tendency to ruminate on negative inferences as a
response to stressful life events. Borrowing from Beck’s (1967) theory of depression
and the hopelessness theory of depression (Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989), Alloy
et al. propose that people with negative cognitive styles tend to make negative
inferences when encountering stressful life events and those who ruminate on the
negative inferences following stressful life events are at risk for depressive episodes.
Consistent with their hypothesis, research efforts have demonstrated that the interaction
between cognitive risk and stress-reactive rumination predicts the occurrence of major
depressive episodes, retrospectively (Alloy et al., 2000) and prospectively (Robinson &
Alloy, 2003). Taken together, these theories suggest that a stressful life event can
trigger ruminative coping responses that subsequently maintain distress symptoms; thus,
these theories may serve as an analogy for rumination in response to a more severe
stressor, such as a traumatic event.
These conceptualizations of depressive rumination have focused exclusively on
the maladaptive consequences of rumination, but there is debate in the literature as to
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whether some forms of rumination can be adaptive. A factor analysis by Treynor,
Gonzalez, and Nolen-Hoeksema (2003) of the Ruminative Response Scale (RRS) from
the Response Styles Questionnaire (RSQ; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), the most
widely validated measures of depressive rumination that came out of the RST, found
evidence for two factors.
Items on the first factor characterized introspective evaluation and problemsolving to alleviate depressive symptoms, described by the researchers as “reflection.”
Item content on the second factor suggested passive comparison of one’s current
situation with some unachieved standard, labeled as “brooding.” These two factors
resemble factors found in other factor-analyses of the RRS. The reflection factor is
similar to the “self-focus” factor found by Cox, Enns, and Taylor (2001) and the
“introspection/self-isolation” factor found by Roberts, Gilboa, and Gotlib (1998).
Similarly, the “self-focused rumination” factor found by Bagby and Parker (2001) and
the “self-blame” subfactor found by Roberts et al. (1998) resembles Treynor and
colleagues (2003) brooding factor.
Treynor et al. (2003) show that the reflection factor was associated with less
depression over time, whereas the brooding factor was associated with more depression
over time, suggesting effective and ineffective components of ruminative processes,
respectively. This pattern of findings may explain the findings by Valdez and Lilly
(2012), that cognitive reappraisal from the TCQ (Wells & Davies, 1994) represents two
cognitive processing strategies, one characterized by an ineffective brooding process
and another as an effective reflective process.
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Teasdale and Barnard (1993) captured the distinction of effective and ineffective
ruminative processing in depression within their Interactive Cognitive Subsystems
(ICS) framework and Processing-Modes Theory (Teasdale, 1999). From the ICS
perspective, ineffective rumination is characterized by thinking about the self (e.g.,
“I’m just a sad person”), about depression-related thoughts and feelings (e.g., “I’m
always going to be sad”), and about how to understand what is going on (e.g., “Nothing
makes me happy”). This subjective quality of thinking about, as opposed to a nonevaluative awareness of moment-to-moment experience, dominates processing at a
propositional level (i.e., specific meanings that have a truth value) in ways that preclude
the processing necessary to modify schematic models at an implicational level (i.e.,
high level, abstract meaning – a holistic sense of the way things are). Expanding on this
line of research, Watkins (2008) has defined ineffective rumination (i.e.,
conceptualizing/doing or brooding) as analytic rumination and effective rumination
(i.e., mindful experiencing/being or self-reflection) as concrete rumination. In an
extensive review of the literature, Watkins (2008) provides compelling evidence for
analytic rumination as ineffective, particularly when it is negatively valenced, in
comparison to the effective nature of concrete rumination.
Processing-Modes Theory and Implications for PTSD
Edward Watkins and colleagues have been clever in empirically evaluating
aspects of the Processing-Mode Theory of depressive rumination by experimentally
manipulating analytic and concrete rumination across several studies with various
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samples, including psychiatric patients. For example, in one study, priming analytic
rumination involved asking participants to “think about what your feelings mean” and,
to prime concrete rumination, participants were asked to “focus your attention on the
physical sensations of your body” (Watkins & Teasdale, 2001). In another study, after
an experimentally induced-failure experience and before completing the study variable
of interest, participants were asked to write a narrative, priming analytic rumination
(e.g., “Why did you feel this way?”) or concrete rumination (e.g., “How did you feel
moment-by-moment”; Watkins & Teasdale, 2004).
This line of research has demonstrated that manipulating analytic rumination
results in increased overgeneral memory (Watkins & Teasdale, 2001), and more
negative future thinking (Lavender & Watkins, 2004). In contrast, compared to analytic
rumination, inducing concrete rumination results in reduced overgeneral memory
(Watkins & Teasdale, 2004), reduced engagement in negative-self judgments (Rimes &
Watkins, 2005), less emotional reactivity following failure (Watkins, Moberly, &
Moulds, 2008), and better social problem solving (Watkins & Moulds, 2005). Taken
together, these studies support the hypotheses generated from the Processing-Mode
Theory (Teasdale, 1999). Namely, analytic rumination may preclude the emotional
processing necessary to modify schematic models stored within memory. Ultimately,
this type of rumination may maintain a vicious cycle of depressogenic themes that
impair problem-solving abilities and subsequent recovery from dysphoria. The
overgeneral memory evident in depressed analytic ruminators may represent repetitive
attempts to make sense of current and/or past difficulties. Indeed, the increased
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tendency to ruminate has been shown to be associated with a greater need to understand
a situation, an increased personal importance of the situation, and a dwelling on the
causes and meanings of the situation (Watkins & Teasdale, 2004).
There are many parallels between theories of PTSD and the Processing-Mode
Theory of rumination in depression (Teasdale, 1999). In fact, repetitive thought,
characterized by analytic rumination, has been conceptualized as a transdiagnostic
process that involves disorder-specific content (Ehring & Watkins, 2008). With regard
to PTSD, it may be that individuals are stuck in a similar posttraumatic stress
maintenance process similar to the depressive maintenance process described by
Teasdale (1999). Specific to PTSD, the posttraumatic stress maintenance process may
be dominated by traumagenic themes and subsequent analytic ruminative processing of
assimilated and over-accommodated trauma-related beliefs in an attempt to understand
and incorporate the traumatic event into preexisting beliefs. The fragmented and
disorganized memory described in individuals with PTSD may represent an attempt to
make sense of the trauma, but avoidance of emotionally-valenced trauma-related stimuli
may interfere with creating a complete trauma memory.
Furthermore, hyperarousal symptoms may regenerate traumagenic themes
through their association with stimuli within the fear network, contributing to a sense of
current threat and an attempt to make sense of the situation through the process of
analytic rumination (e.g., “I’m feeling anxious, which must mean that danger is present.
I always need to be on the lookout for danger to protect myself”). According to various
treatment models for PTSD (e.g., Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Foa & Rothbaum, 1998; Resick
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& Schnicke, 1993), recovery from PTSD requires an elaboration of the trauma memory
and a modification of problematic appraisals, both of which are promoted through the
use of processing information at very concrete levels.
Only one known study has attempted to examine ruminative mechanisms in
trauma survivors using the modes of processing framework (i.e., Ehring, Frank, &
Ehlers, 2008). These researchers adapted the Catastrophizing Interview originally
developed by Vasey and Borkovec (1992) to assess perseverative thinking about a
worrisome topic in an iterative fashion by asking interviewees to elaborate their
concerns repeatedly until they adequately addressed their concern. In their study, Ehring
et al. (2008) instructed participants to address their concerns related to a motor vehicle
accident. Participants’ responses were coded on a scale of 1 (abstract; indistinct, crosssituational, equivocal, unclear, aggregated) to 5 (concrete; distinct, situationally
specific, unequivocal, clear, singular). They found that ruminative concreteness was
negatively related to PTSD symptom severity at one and three months. Furthermore,
self-reported frequency of trauma-related rumination predicted greater PTSD symptom
severity, but the addition of reduced concreteness in the model significantly improved
the prediction of PTSD symptom severity. This preliminary evidence provides support
for the supposition that reduced concreteness may be a potential mechanism by which
rumination maintains posttraumatic stress, but more research is needed to support this
idea. If it is the case that the mechanisms maintaining PTSD symptoms are those same
mechanisms proposed to maintain depression symptoms, this could have implications
for PTSD treatment.
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Treatment implications
Cognitive-behavioral interventions for PTSD, such as Prolonged Exposure (PE)
and Cognitive Processing Therapy (CPT), have dominated as the treatments of choice
(Cloitre et al., 2011). Both PE and CPT have been classified as “Level A” treatments
(i.e., evidence is based on randomized, well-controlled clinical trials for individuals
with PTSD) by the Agency for Health Care Policy Research (Cahill, Rothbaum, Resick,
& Follette, 2009). In fact, they are both first-line treatments for PTSD in the Veterans
Health Administration (Karlin et al., 2010). Yet, dropout rates for these therapies
average 20.6% over 12 trials of exposure therapy, 22.1% for cognitive therapy, and
26.0% over 12 trials of exposure therapy combined with cognitive therapy (Hembree et
al., 2003). Critics have suggested that some clients may find it difficult to tolerate
trauma exposures, which may diminish treatment compliance and outcomes (Tarrier &
Humphreys, 2000). There is also concern that overwhelming anxiety in the client may
render exposure treatment ineffective (Jaycox, Foa, & Morral, 1998). Additionally,
difficulty with distress tolerance and a tendency to dissociate under stress may predict
less favorable outcomes (Chemtob, Novaco, Hamada, Gross, & Smith, 1997).
These concerns have sparked recent interest in third-wave cognitive behavioral
therapeutic strategies, and mindfulness-based approaches. Mindfulness-based
approaches share a great deal with behavioral and cognitive therapies, such as PE and
CPT, but the focus on altering the client’s relationships to internal experiences and the
strategies to do so is unique to mindfulness-based approaches (Roemer & Orsillo,
2009). In third-wave cognitive behavioral approaches, negative emotions, experiences,
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and circumstances are not considered problematic. Rather, the behavior in which an
individual engages to avoid these negative experiences is considered the cause of
psychopathology, and therefore, individuals are taught to embrace acceptance of self,
internal experiences, environment, and others.
Segal, Williams, and Teasdale (2002) have proposed a treatment for “mind
management,” which they termed mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT), a
treatment designed to teach individuals to disengage from the central engine modes that
support depressive maintenance and encourage mindful experiencing/being (or concrete
rumination). Methods to teach these skills incorporate elements of mindfulness
meditation. Mindfulness is defined as “paying attention in a particular way: on purpose,
in the present moment, and nonjudgmentally” (Kabat-Zinn, 1994, p. 4). Thus, thoughts
and feelings are not suppressed, analyzed, or judged for content, which are strategies
inherent in analytic rumination. Instead, mindfulness training cultivates an orientation
of radical acceptance (i.e., willingness to accept what is in one’s control and what is
not) and a non-goal orientation stance (i.e., being unattached to a specific outcome or
achievement). It does not aim explicitly to change schematic mental models as
cognitive restructuring strategies would. However, it may implicitly achieve alternative,
less dysfunctional, schematic models by providing one with the tools to accept and be
aware of bodily sensations and thoughts that are perceived as threatening or painful,
leading to changes in aversion-related schematic models that are central to processing
configurations in depression theories (e.g., Teasdale, 1999). Additionally, mindfulness
teaches one to view thoughts or feelings as objects of awareness that come and go,
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instead of relating them to “self” or “reality.” Mindfulness interventions have been
shown to reduce depressive symptoms (Watkins et al., 2007) and to reduce relapse in
people with recurrent depression (Teasdale et al., 2000).
Trauma clinicians are beginning to advocate for the use of mindfulness as a way
to help trauma survivors become more focused on the present moment, and let go of the
“tyranny” of the past and fear of the future (Follette, Palm, & Pearson, 2006). Two
recent studies have reported on the effectiveness of group Mindfulness-Based Stress
Reduction (MBSR) in trauma survivors, a common clinical method for teaching
mindfulness in a standardized eight-session class series. In both a sample of community
child sexual abuse (CSA) survivors (Kimbrough, Magyari, Langenberg, Chesney, &
Berman, 2010) and veterans seeking treatment at a VA hospital (Kearney, McDermott,
Malte, Martinez, & Simpson, 2012), symptoms of depression and posttraumatic stress
decreased after the MBSR course and were maintained after six months. In the veteran
sample, 47.7% of veterans had clinically significant improvements in PTSD symptoms,
and in the sexual assault survivor sample, PTSD symptoms of avoidance/numbing were
most greatly reduced. However, in both samples, MBSR was used as an adjunct to
individual psychotherapy. Therefore, the unique effects of the MBSR program cannot
be determined, but the results of these studies suggest that mindfulness-based
interventions for PTSD warrant further investigation.
The purpose of this study is to examine dimensions of rumination (i.e., analytic
rumination and concrete rumination) in trauma survivors and their relation with
problematic trauma beliefs, negative affectivity, and trauma intrusions to explicate the
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mechanisms by which rumination may maintain and/or promote recovery from
posttraumatic sequelae. Uncovering these mechanisms may ultimately provide a
theoretical framework for the application of stand-alone mindfulness-based
interventions to treating PTSD.
Summary
As suggested by social cognitive theories, it is only a natural human response to
attempt to make sense out of one’s experiences. This involves creating an organized
memory of the event in an effort to process and understand the experience (Foa et al.,
1995; Harber & Pennebaker, 1992). However, when one is confronted with a lifealtering traumatic event, this task may prove to be more troublesome because of the
potentially terrifying content with which it is associated. Thus, some individuals may
avoid engaging with the memory of the trauma(s) and, instead, focus on negative
inferences and problematic (i.e., assimilated and over-accommodated) appraisals of the
trauma in an attempt to understand the reasons for the event and protect themselves
from future danger. This type of processing, thinking about the causes and
consequences of the trauma (i.e., analytic rumination), without thinking about the
trauma itself and creating a complete trauma narrative, may strengthen problematic
trauma beliefs. This cognitive avoidance strategy may produce negative emotions that
regenerate traumagenic themes within the mental fear network and result in increased
anxiety and trauma intrusions, ultimately maintaining posttraumatic stress symptoms.
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As opposed to avoiding trauma stimuli, as one would when engaging in analytic
rumination, mindfulness-based strategies focus on changing one’s relationship with
internal experiences, including thoughts and emotions. This change allows one to
engage in concrete rumination, characterized by non-evaluative self-focused attention in
the present moment to promote the use of present feelings to guide problem solution
and resolution. By teaching mindfulness-based skills that embrace acceptance of self,
internal experiences, environment, and others, individuals with PTSD may be more
tolerant of engaging with painful trauma memories, which may provide the opportunity
to build an organized trauma narrative that may disconfirm or amend problematic
trauma beliefs that have kept them stuck in the recovery process. Additionally, as
individuals learn to tolerate and accept negative emotions and thoughts, rebound effects
from previously avoided stimuli may diminish and break apart the associations within
the mental fear network, which may ultimately resolve posttraumatic stress symptoms.
However, more research is needed to understand the mechanisms by which traumarelated rumination maintains or promotes resolution of posttraumatic stress symptoms.
The Proposed Study
The proposed study investigates the relation among the forms of rumination
(i.e., analytical and concrete), problematic trauma beliefs, anxiety, negative affectivity,
and trauma intrusions. In their cognitive model of PTSD, Ehlers and Clark (2000)
propose that analytic rumination maintains posttraumatic stress by strengthening
problematic trauma beliefs and interfering with the formation of a complete trauma
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narrative, eventuating in negative emotions, anxiety, and increased trauma intrusions.
According to Teasdale and Barnard’s (1993) and Teasdale’s (1999) Processing-Mode
Theory, concrete rumination promotes radical acceptance and a non-goal orientation
stance allowing one to accept and be aware of bodily sensations and thoughts that are
perceived as threatening or painful. Subsequently, the greater amount of information
that is accepted into one’s awareness serves to challenge and modify dysfunctional
schemas and decrease associated distress.
Hypotheses and Predictions
P1: There will be no differences among rumination groups (i.e., analytic
rumination group, concrete rumination group, control group) on T1 anxiety before a
trauma-specific perseverative thinking task.
H1: Anxiety at T2 will significantly increase from baseline (T1) after a traumaspecific perseverative thinking task, and T2 anxiety will be greatest for analytic
ruminators, followed by controls, followed by concrete ruminators.
P2: There will be no differences among rumination groups (i.e., analytic
rumination group, concrete rumination group, control group) on T1 negative affectivity
before a trauma-specific perseverative thinking task.
H2: Negative affectivity at T2 will significantly increase from baseline (T1)
after a trauma-specific perseverative thinking task, and T2 negative affectivity will be
greatest for analytic ruminators, followed by controls, followed by concrete ruminators.
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P3: There will be no differences among rumination groups in T1 trauma
intrusions before a trauma-specific perseverative thinking task.
H3: Trauma intrusions at T2 will significantly increase from baseline (T1) after
a trauma-specific perseverative thinking task, and T2 trauma intrusions will be greatest
for analytic ruminators, followed by controls, followed by concrete ruminators.
H4: Both anxiety and negative affectivity at T2 will be positively associated
with T2 trauma intrusions.
H5: Problematic trauma beliefs expressed during a trauma-specific perseverative
thinking task will be most prevalent for women in the analytic rumination group,
followed by the control group, followed by the concrete group.
H6: Problematic trauma beliefs will be positively associated with T2 anxiety, T2
negative affectivity, and T2 trauma intrusions.
H7: Anxiety at T2 will mediate the relation between problematic trauma beliefs
and T2 trauma intrusions.
H8: Negative affectivity at T2 will mediate the relation between problematic
trauma beliefs and T2 trauma intrusions.

CHAPTER 2
PROJECT METHODS
Procedures
Prescreen
Women were recruited from (1) the Psychology Department student subject pool
at Northern Illinois University and (2) the community on a rolling basis through
advertisements in local commercial locations (grocery stores, Laundromats), social
service agencies, and college billboards, and through previous research databases
through which participants consented to be re-contacted for future studies. Student
participants from the subject pool were pre-screened during mass testing with items
from the Traumatic Life Events Questionnaire (TLEQ) (Kubany et al., 2000; see
Appendix B) to determine their eligibility for the study. Student participants who met
inclusionary criteria based on their answers during mass testing were contacted via email and invited to participate. They elected to participate voluntarily and were given
course credit for their participation. Participants recruited from the community were
asked to call the advertised phone number to learn more about the study. During this
phone conversation, potential community participants were pre-screened using a
standard form, which asked questions about their history of traumatic experiences using
items from the TLEQ (Kubany et al., 2000; Appendix C).
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Only women over the age of 18 who endorsed being the victim of assaultive
violence (i.e., sexual and/or physical assault) were recruited to participate in the study,
and only those who identified assaultive violence as their worst traumatic experience
during the CI were included in the main analyses. Previous research has shown
assaultive traumas to be among the most distressing events reported by college students
(Frazier et al., 2009) and community trauma victims (Breslau, Peterson, Poisson,
Schultz, & Lucia, 2004), to be the types of events most strongly associated with
posttraumatic cognitions (Lilly, Valdez, & Graham-Bermann, 2011), and to result in the
highest probability of PTSD (Breslau et al., 1998). Women were excluded from
participation if (a) the last incident of the identified trauma occurred before the age of
16, to reduce the potential of developmental trauma effects in the study; and (b) the
trauma occurred within the last three months, as this group of individuals could have
been coping with a high degree of posttraumatic stress symptoms (Rothbaum et al.,
1992) and participation in this study could have placed participants under additional
distress or interfered with study results.
Online Questionnaire
Women who met inclusionary criteria at the prescreening were asked to
complete a set of self-report questionnaires online to obtain demographic and trauma
history information one week prior to coming into the lab for a research session.
Informed written consent was waived. Instead, participants consented to participate
online by clicking the appropriate button that directed them to the online study
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questionnaires. Participants who did not have access to a computer or the internet
completed the online questionnaire in the research lab, where they were given access to
a computer. Participants who did not complete the questionnaires in the lab were
encouraged to complete the online questionnaire on a secure network, preferably a
home network, to reduce threats to confidentiality.
The online questionnaires were created using SawTooth Software SSI Web and
hosted by servers at Northern Illinois University. The online questionnaire took
approximately 30 minutes to complete. Community participants were paid $10 for their
time, and student participants were given course credit (1 credit). Following the
completion of the online questionnaires, participants were assigned randomly to either
an experimental condition (analytic rumination or concrete rumination) or the control
group. They were then contacted via phone or e-mail to schedule a lab research session
to complete the research study. Childcare was provided by undergraduate research
assistants during the lab research session when needed.
Research Session
The mean number of days between the online questionnaire and research session
was 15.14 (SD = 10.59) and ranged from 7 days to 61 days, which did not differ by
condition, F(2, 62) = 0.66, p = .522. The lab research session took approximately one
and a half hours to complete. Community participants received an additional $30 for
their time, and student participants received additional course credit (3 credits). The lab
research session began by having participants complete the Beck Anxiety Inventory
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(BAI; Beck & Steer, 1993), followed by the Positive and Negative Affect ScheduleExpanded Form (PANAS-X; Watson & Clark, 1999), and then the Thought Listing
Procedure (TLP; Cacioppo, von Hippel, & Ernst, 1997) to obtain a baseline of state
anxiety, state affect, and percentage of trauma intrusions, respectively. After the
principal investigator (PI) administered the BAI and PANAS-X questionnaires to
participants, she left the room to reduce distractions as participants completed the TLP,
during which she timed nine minutes on a stopwatch until the next study procedure.
After the nine minutes had concluded, a female undergraduate research assistant
came into the room to administer the experimental manipulation (i.e., Modes of
Processing induction; Watkins et al., 2008). The undergraduate research assistant was
blind to study hypotheses and administered the experimental manipulation to all
participants to reduce administration influences and keep the principal investigator blind
to participant condition. Participants in the experimental conditions were primed with
either analytic rumination or concrete rumination, whereas participants in the control
condition counted the number of verbs in each of 30 written scenarios.
After the experimental condition, the undergraduate research assistant left the
room, and the principal investigator returned to administer a trauma-specific
perseverative thinking task (i.e., CI; Davey & Levy, 1998; Vasey & Borkovec, 1992) on
their index interpersonal trauma. The interview was audio recorded and later transcribed
by the principal investigator.
The remainder of the study session involved having participants complete the
BAI, PANAS-X, and TLP again to obtain a post-manipulation assessment of state
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anxiety, state affect, and percentage of trauma intrusions. The study concluded with
inducing a positive mood state to remove potential negative residual effects from
revisiting trauma memories. To induce positive mood, participants were asked to read a
short positive story (see Appendix J). Following the completion of the study,
participants were thanked for their participation and given a debriefing form. See
Appendix A for an outline of the research session procedure.
In total, 83 participants (62 community women and 21 female students)
completed the online questionnaire, and 82 were invited to complete the research
session (1 student participant denied an interpersonal trauma history in the online
questionnaire and, therefore, did not qualify for the study). Of the 82 participants,
79.27% (n = 65; 57 community women and 8 female students) completed the research
session. Community participants (χ2 [1, N = 82] = 24.82, p < .001) and those who were
older (t[80] = 2.96, p = .004) were significantly more likely to complete the research
session. Participants who completed the research session did not differ from participants
who completed only the online questionnaire with regard to sexual orientation (χ2 [2, N
= 81] = 1.04, p = .594), ethnicity (χ2 [1, N = 78] = 1.21, p = .271), race (χ2[6, N = 77] =
4.61, p = .595), relationship status (χ2[5, N = 82] = 4.68, p = .456), education (χ2 [5, N =
82] = 3.89, p = .565), household income (χ2[4, N = 77] = 6.45, p = .168), or whether
they had previously attended therapy for mental health issues (χ2 [1, N = 82] = .41, p =
.520). Of the 65 participants who completed the research session, two additional
participants were excluded from the main analyses because their index trauma reported
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during the CI did not qualify for the study inclusion criteria. Both identified unwanted
sexual contact as their index event, which did not qualify as sexual assault.
Therefore, analyses presented in this study are representative of 63 participants;
56 community women and 7 female students (two students in the analytic rumination
condition, two students in the concrete rumination condition, and one student in the
control group). The average age of participants was 31.48 (SD = 12.76), ranging from
18 to 67. The majority of participants were not Hispanic or Latino 79.4% (n = 50).
Approximately half were Caucasian/White (50.8%; n = 32); 30.2% were African
American/Black (n = 19), 1.6% were Asian (n = 1), 1.6% were American Indian or
Alaskan Native (n = 1), 6.3% were Biracial (n = 4), 1.6% reported Unknown (n = 1),
and 6.3% declined to answer (n = 4). Most participants in the subsample were
heterosexual (85.7%, n = 54) and 39.7% were single (i.e., never married; n = 24). The
majority of participants had some college or vocational school training (54%; n = 34),
and the greatest proportion of participants reported a household income of $15,000 or
less (33.3%, n = 21). More than half of the participants reported seeing a therapist for
mental health issues (60.3%, n = 38); mean item ratings for the success of previous
mental health therapy were 3.37 (SD = 1.34), which represents “Somewhat Successful.”
Across experimental groups (control, concrete, analytic,), participants did not differ
with regard to age (p = .406), ethnicity (p = .545), race (p = .401), sexual orientation (p
= .418), marital status (p = .501), education level (p = .448), household income (p =
.068), or previous mental health services (p = .645). See Table 1 for a summary of
descriptive statistics across experimental groups.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics of Manipulation Check by Condition (N = 63)
______________________________________________________________________
Variable
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Standard
Deviation
______________________________________________________________________
Analytic (n = 21)
Analytic Check

20

100

70.95

24.88

Concrete Check

10

100

76.19

24.18

Analytic Check

10

90

63.81

28.89

Concrete Check

0

90

46.67

26.52

Analytic Check

10

100

57.62

27.19

Concrete Check

60

100

89.52

11.17

Control (n = 21)

Concrete (n = 21)

______________________________________________________________________
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Measures 1
Demographics Questionnaire
Participants completed a demographic questionnaire created by the PI in order to
assess age, ethnicity (Hispanic or Latino, Not Hispanic or Latino), race (Caucasian or
White, African American, Asian, American Indian or Alaskan Native, Native
Hawaiin/other Pacific Islander, Biracial, Unknown), marital status (single, dating and
not living with a partner, living with partner/cohabitating, married, separated, widowed,
divorced, remarried), sexual orientation (heterosexual, homosexual, bisexual, other),
household income ($15,000 or less; $15,001 – $25,000; $25,001 – $35,000; $35,001 –
$50,000; $50,001 or more), education level (grade school or less, some high school,
high school degree/GED, some college or vocational school, college degree, some
graduate school, graduate degree), and previous mental health therapy experience
(condition for seeking therapy services, time involved in therapy, perception of whether
treatment was successful).
Traumatic Life Events Questionnaire (TLEQ)
Traumatic experiences and an index interpersonal traumatic event, specifically
an assaultive violence, were identified using the TLEQ (Kubany et al., 2000). The
TLEQ is a 23-item broad-spectrum measure of trauma exposure. The first 22 items list
behaviorally descriptive potential traumatic events (e.g., natural disaster, motor vehicle

1
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accident, sexual assault, physical abuse, war/combat exposure) and the 23rd item
category represents “other events” with a list of examples. Each item asks respondents
to identify how many times they have experienced that particular event using the
following rating scale: never, once, twice, three times, four times, five times, and more
than five times. For the purposes of this study, only intentionally caused traumas (i.e., a
traumatic event in which another human being inflicts physical or psychological injury
on another human being) from the TLEQ were used to pre-screen participants for
inclusion criteria. Intentionally caused traumas were selected from the TLEQ using the
same procedure as Frazier et al. (2009), with the exception of abortion, which was not
conceptualized in this study as an intentionally caused trauma.
Endorsement of events on the TLEQ is designed to meet DSM-IV-TR Criterion
A1 of PTSD. Respondents are also asked to choose whether their subjective experience
included intense fear, helplessness, or horror in response to the event to assess DSMIV-TR Criterion A2 of PTSD. On some items involving interpersonal trauma, the
respondent is asked to identify the perpetrator from a list of categories (e.g., stranger,
friend or acquaintance, parent or caregiver, relative, intimate partner) and, in some
cases, whether threat or force was used, as well as if they were seriously injured. On
items asking about sexual assault, the respondent can select if there was oral, anal, or
vaginal penetration.
In the original development of the measure, the TLEQ demonstrated good
temporal stability for a two-week time period (Kubany et al., 2000). For assessment of
Criterion A1, Kappa coefficients were above .40 for 20 of 21 items and .60 or above for
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12 items. For assessment of Criterion A1, the percentage of traumatic event occurrence
agreements (i.e., respondents endorsed experiencing a traumatic event at Time 1 and
Time 2) ranged from 50% to 100% and averaged 81%; nonoccurrence agreements (i.e.,
respondents did not endorse experiencing a traumatic event at Time 1 and Time 2)
ranged from 25% to 100% and averaged 82%; the overall mean percentage agreements
averaged 86%. Pearson product-moment correlations assessing the relationship between
Time 1 and Time 2 frequency of occurrence reports for each event averaged .77 (all pvalues < .05). For the assessment of Criterion A2, temporal stability was examined for
items in which an event was endorsed as experienced at both time periods. Kappa
coefficients were .40 or higher for 19 of 21 items and .60 or higher for 16 items. The
overall percentage of occurrence agreements was 91%; nonoccurrence agreement was
81%; overall percentage of test-retest agreements was 89%.
The TLEQ has been shown to discriminate between those who did and did not
meet PTSD diagnostic criteria. PTSD positive respondents reported having experienced
significantly more types of traumatic events (M = 10.7 versus M = 6.4), total traumatic
events (M = 32.0 versus M = 16.8), and traumatic events that evoked fear, helplessness,
or horror (M = 8.4 versus M = 4.7; Kubany et al., 2000). The TLEQ has been
demonstrated to be a comprehensive traumatic event assessment. In one study utilizing
a clinical sample, when compared with the single-item traumatic event assessment in
the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID) (First, Spitzer, Gibbon, &
Williams, 1998), the TLEQ produced a nine-fold higher rate of traumatic event
identification (Peirce, Burke, Stoller, Neufeld, & Brooner, 2009). That is, the total
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number of potential traumatic events reported in response to the TLEQ was nine times
greater than the number of potential traumatic events reported using the SCID, which
suggests that the TLEQ is more sensitive in identifying PTSD cases. In fact, the
comprehensive nature of the TLEQ increased the rate of PTSD diagnosis from 25%
using the single-question assessment of the SCID to 33% of the sample when the TLEQ
was used. Six of the discrepant diagnoses resulted from failure of the SCID to identify
any potential traumatic event for PTSD evaluation; the remaining discrepant diagnoses
may have resulted from participants having to choose their “most distressing” event
from a smaller list generated by the SCID, which, although relatively more distressing
than the others, was not distressing enough to precipitate a PTSD diagnosis.
Further, this increase in potential traumatic event identification and PTSD
diagnosis was greater for women than men. The TLEQ has also correctly identified
individuals based on their trauma history. For example, 92% of women in an intimate
partner violence support group endorsed the item assessing physical abuse by a partner,
and 98% of women who were estimated to have PTSD on the basis of questionnaire
assessment, endorsed Criterion A2 on this item (Kubany et al., 2000).
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI)
The BAI (Beck & Steer, 1993) was used to assess state anxiety. The BAI is a
21-item self-report questionnaire used to measure the severity of an individual’s
anxiety. Items consist of questions pertaining to how the individual has been feeling in
the last week (e.g., numbness and tingling, sweating not due to heat, fear of the worst
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happening). However, for the purposes of this study, the directions were adapted so that
participants were asked to rate their immediate level of anxiety. Items are rated from 0
(Not at all) to 3 (Severely) and totaled to a maximum score of 63. Item totals between 0
and 7 represent a “minimal level of anxiety,” total scores between 8 and 15 are
indicative of “mild anxiety,” total scores ranging from 16 to 25 suggest “moderate
anxiety,” and total scores between 26 and 63 are considered “severe anxiety.”
The BAI was created originally to include two components of anxiety: cognitive
(i.e., fearful thoughts and impaired cognitive functioning) and somatic (i.e.,
physiological arousal; Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988). However, other factor
structures have been used. Beck and Steer (1991) used a four-factor structure with
outpatients, including neurophysiological, autonomic, subjective, and panic components
of anxiety. Beck, Steer, and Beck (1993) used a three-factor structure, including
subjective, somatic, and panic subscale scores to differentiate among a sample of
clinically anxious outpatients. In each case, the somatic subscale is emphasized as it is
tapped by 15 out of the 21 items.
The BAI was designed for measuring anxiety that minimizes the overlap
between depression and anxiety scales. That is, although other studies have shown that
anxiety measures such as the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory are highly correlated with
depression (Endler, Cox, Parker, & Bagby, 1992), the BAI is shown to be less
contaminated by depressive content (Beck et al., 1998). In the development of the BAI,
Beck et al. (1998) found it to be moderately correlated with the revised Hamilton
Anxiety Rating Scale (r = .51), but only mildly correlated with the revised Hamilton
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Depression Rating Scale (r = .25). Additionally, the BAI discriminates between anxious
diagnostic groups (e.g., panic disorder, generalized anxiety disorder) and nonanxious
diagnostic groups (e.g., major depression, dysthymic disorder; Beck et al., 1988). The
BAI has demonstrated high internal consistency (α = .92) and test-retest reliability over
one week (r = .75). Internal consistencies for Time 1 and Time 2 anxiety were .92 and
.94, respectively.
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule- Expanded Form (PANAS-X)
The PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 1999) was used to assess negative affectivity.
The PANAS-X is a 60-item self-report questionnaire that assesses two broad, general
factors labeled Negative Affect (NA; Distressed) and Positive Affect (PA; Excited),
with 10 items per scale. It includes the identical measures of general PA and general
NA as the original 20-item PANAS. The PANAS-X was created because, although the
broad, general dimensions of PA and NA account for much of the variance in selfreported affect, specific affective dimensions also can be identified. Thus, the PANASX also measures 11 specific affective states (Fear, Sadness, Guilt, Hostility, Shyness,
Fatigue, Surprise, Joviality, Self-Assurance, Attentiveness, and Serenity) using three to
eight items for each lower-order scale. Each item is rated on a 5-point scale from 1
(very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely). A total mean score is created by summing
all items corresponding to that scale and then dividing by the number of items on that
scale, with higher scores indicating higher degrees of affectivity on that dimension.
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PA and NA scales of the PANAS-X are reliable and valid, regardless of the
subject population (student, community samples, psychiatric patients) or time frame
used to generate mood ratings (moment, today, past few days, past few weeks, past
year, general; Watson & Clark, 1999). The two general dimensions of PA and NA
account for most of the variance in self-rated affect, approximately one half to three
quarters of the common variance in mood (Watson, 1988b; Watson & Tellegen, 1985).
Internal consistencies are high for both higher-order scales, generally ranging from .83
to .90 for PA, and from .85 to .90 for NA. The correlation between PA and NA scales is
generally low, typically ranging from -.05 to -.35. Convergent correlations for the
higher-order factors of the PANAS-X (PA and NA) and their corresponding PA and NA
factors from Zevon and Tellegen’s (1982) 60 mood descriptors ranges from .89 to .95,
whereas discriminant correlations between PANAS-X PA and Tellegen’s 60 mood
descriptors NA factor and between PANAS-X NA with Zevon and Tellegen’s 60 mood
descriptors PA factor are low and range from -.02 to -.18.
The 11 subscales of the PANAS-X show a pattern of data similar to that
observed with the higher-order scales. The median internal consistency for the 11
subscales across 11 samples range from .76 (Serenity) to .93 (Joviality). The PANAS-X
assesses affective states that are broadly similar to those measured in existing multiaffect inventories, such as the Profile of Mood States (POMS; McNair, Lorr, &
Droppleman, 1971). Each of the PANAS-X lower-order scales is strongly related to its
POMS counterpart, with convergent correlations ranging from .85 to .91. However, the
PANAS-X scales generally provide a less redundant and more differentiated assessment
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of affect and, thus, show better discriminant validity. Specifically, the mean correlation
among the PANAS-X Fear, Hostility, Sadness, and Fatigue scales was .45, which is
significantly lower than the mean correlation of .60 among the corresponding POMS
scales.
Within the hierarchical arrangement of the PANAS-X, Fear, Sadness, Guilt, and
Hostility are classified as Basic Negative Emotions; Joviality, Self-Assurance, and
Attentiveness are classified as Basic Positive Emotions; Shyness, Fatigue, Surprise, and
Serenity are grouped as Other Affective States because they do not strongly or
consistently define either of the second-order factors. Fear, Sadness, Guilt, and Hostility
are strong markers of NA, with loadings ranging from .69 to .83. Joviality, SelfAssurance, and Attentiveness have loadings ranging from .70 to .86 on PA. Lowerorder Basic Negative Emotions subscale scores correlate .92 with general NA in the
Moment, Basic Positive Emotions subscale scores correlate .94 with general PA in the
Moment, whereas the discriminant correlations are invariably low, ranging from -.01 to
-.11.
Both the higher-order and lower-order PANAS-X scales have been used to
validly assess state and trait affect and, most relevant to this study, fluctuations in mood
(Watson & Clark, 1999). For example, studies have found that fluctuations in NA, but
not PA, correlated with perceived stress, whereas social activity and physical exercise
were more highly related to PA than NA over a five- to seven-week period (Clark &
Watson, 1988; Watson, 1988a; Watson & Tellegen, 1985). One study on diurnal
variation in mood found that PA rose sharply from early morning until noon, remained
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relatively stable until 9 p.m., and then fell rapidly, whereas NA did not exhibit a
systematic diurnal pattern (Clark, Watson, & Leeka, 1989). In another study, PA
increased significantly from baseline after social interaction and exercise, but was not
affected by test stress; conversely, NA significantly increased from baseline by a
stressful examination, but was not influenced by social activity or exercise (McIntyre,
Watson, & Cunningham, 1990).
Replicating and extending previous research, Watson, Clark, McIntyre, and
Hamaker (1992) found that daily PA, Joviality, Self-Assurance, and Attentiveness, but
not NA, correlated with daily social activity measures within-subjects over a five- to
seven-week period. Test-retest reliability has been shown to range from .23 (Surprise)
to .49 (Shyness), indicating a moderate level of stability, but more importantly, that
subjects have a characteristic range of affect within which short-term fluctuations occur
(Watson & Clark, 1999). Thus, the PANAS-X scales are sensitive to changing internal
and external circumstances, and can be used validly to assess short-term state affect. For
the purposes of this study, only the NA subscale was used to assess fluctuations in state
NA. Internal consistencies for Time 1 and Time 2 NA in this sample were .82 and .89,
respectively.
Trauma Intrusions
A written thought -listing procedure was used to determine the presence of
trauma-related thoughts (Cacioppo et al., 1997). The written format was used to
maximize feelings of privacy due to the personal and emotional nature of the material
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(Cacioppo & Petty, 1981). Participants were instructed to monitor and write their
thoughts for nine minutes in order to establish a rating of the frequency of traumarelated thoughts. In order to reduce external distractions during thought listing,
participants were instructed of the directions and then left to record thoughts on a blank
page as they sat alone in an empty room. The instructions were similar to those used in
other investigations of personally relevant intrusive thoughts (Beck et al., 2006; Kelly &
Kahn, 1994; Roemer & Borkovec, 1994; Shipherd & Beck, 1999, 2005; Wegner &
Gold, 1995; Wenzlaff, Wegner, & Roper, 1988) and were as follows:
I would like you to spend the next nine minutes writing on this blank page
whatever information is present in your awareness from moment to moment.
Your report might include, but is not limited to, descriptions of images,
memories, feelings, fantasies, plans, sensations, observations, daydreams,
objects that catch your attention, or efforts to solve a problem. It is OK to think
about absolutely anything [including your traumatic experience 2]. Do not worry
about spelling or grammar.
Studies using the TLP have found that trauma intrusions increase after inducing
thought suppression, especially for those who meet criteria for PTSD (Amstadter &
Vernon, 2006; Shipherd & Beck, 1999, 2005). Additionally, increases in trauma-related
thoughts on the TLP have been shown to be associated with increases in negative
affectivity, anxiety, distress, and diminished perceptions of controllability over thoughts
(Shipherd & Beck, 1999).

2

Writing in brackets only included in post-manipulation instructions.

46
Rumination Induction
Processing modes were induced using the procedures outlined in Watkins et al.
(2008). In this procedure 15 positive and 15 negative written scenarios across a range of
settings (social, interpersonal, academic, employment), each approximately three
sentences in length, were used to induce either concrete rumination or analytic
rumination. For example, one negative scenario read as follows:
You have an argument with your best friend. You have only had a few minor
disagreements in the past, but this argument becomes heated and she tells you
that she feels that she will never be able to trust you again. You are shocked and
hurt.
One positive scenario read as follows:
You go for a job interview. You are well prepared and able to answer the
questions competently. The interview panel is friendly and encouraging, and you
leave feeling quite confident that you had performed well enough to secure the
position.
All participants read through all 30 scenarios, with instructions to spend a
minute concentrating on each event. The order of the written scenarios were
randomized with the constraint that there would be no more than three scenarios of the
same valence presented consecutively.
In the analytic rumination condition, participants were instructed as follows for
each scenario: “I would like you to think about why it happened, and to analyze the
causes, meanings, and implications of this event.” In the concrete rumination condition,
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participants were instructed as follows for each scenario: “I would like you to focus on
how it happened, and to imagine in your mind as vividly and concretely as possible a
‘movie’ of how this event unfolded, including how you felt moment-by-moment.” In
the control condition, participants were instructed as follows for each scenario: “I would
now like you to spend a minute concentrating on this text. Specifically, I would like you
to count the number of verbs that occur in the description of this event.” These
instructions were chosen to ensure that participants read the text without inducing either
experimental processing mode. Prior to induction, all participants practiced adopting the
assigned processing mode on the same (negative) practice scenario. For the practice and
target scenarios, participants were instructed to say aloud their answer for one minute
and to stop when instructed by the interviewer.
Manipulation check. To ensure that the processing configuration was adopted posttraining, immediately after the processing mode induction, participants were asked to
rate what proportion of their thoughts (0%-100%) during the experimental task were
focused on trying to understand, explain, or make sense of things (analytic check) and
what proportion of their thoughts (0%-100%) during the experimental task were
focused on concrete objects, feelings, and sensations (concrete check; see Table 2).
With regard to this sample, women in the concrete rumination condition reported that
significantly more of their thoughts were focused on concrete objects, feelings, and
sensations (M = 89.52, SD = 11.17) compared to women in the analytic rumination
condition (M = 76.19, SD = 24.18), t(40) = 2.29, p = .027. Furthermore, within the
concrete condition, women reported that more of their thoughts were focused on

48
concrete objects, feelings, and sensations than trying to understand, explain, or make
sense of things (M difference= 31.9), t(20) = 5.35, p <.001.
Women in the analytic rumination condition reported that more of their thoughts were
focused on trying to understand, explain, or make sense of things (M = 70.95, SD =
24.88) compared to women in the concrete condition (M = 57.62, SD = 27.19), though
this difference did not reach statistical significance, t(40) = 1.66, p = .105. These mean
reports are similar to another study that used a similar processing mode induction and
the same manipulation check, though a significant difference was found, t(80) = 2.54, p
= .01 (analytic condition M = 65.2, SD = 18.02; concrete condition M = 51.5, SD =
29.5; Vassilopoulos & Watkins, 2009). Also, within the analytic condition, women did
not differ on the proportion of their thoughts that were focused on trying to understand,
explain, or make sense of things compared to the proportion of their thoughts that were
focused on concrete objects, feelings, and sensations (M difference= 5.24), t(40) = 0.71,
p = .486.
Additionally, women in the control group reported that significantly less of their
thoughts were focused on concrete objects, feelings, and sensations (M = 46.67, SD =
26.52) compared to women in the concrete rumination condition, t(40) = 6.83, p < .001.
However, women in the control group did not differ from women in the analytic
rumination condition with regard to the proportion of their thoughts that were focused
on trying to understand, explain, or make sense of things, t(40) = 0.86, p = .396. Within
the control condition, women rated that more of their thoughts were focused on trying
to understand, explain, or make sense of things than on concrete objects, feelings, and

49
Table 2
Percentage of Participants who Reported Demographics by Condition (N = 63)
______________________________________________________________________
Demographics
Control
Analytic
Concrete
n (subsample %)
n (subsample %)
n (subsample %)
______________________________________________________________________
Ethnicity
Hispanic or Latino

4 (19)

2 (9.5)

4 (19)

Not Hispanic or Latino

17 (81)

18 (85.7)

15 (71.4)

White

13 (61.9)

12 (57.1)

7 (33.33)

Black

5 (23.8)

6 (28.6)

8 (38.1)

Asian

--

1 (4.8)

--

American Indian

--

--

1 (4.8)

Hawaiin/Pacific Islander

1 (4.8)

--

--

Biracial

1 (4.8)

2 (9.5)

1 (4.8)

Unknown

--

--

1 (4.8)

Heterosexual

18 (85.7)

20 (95.2)

16 (76.2)

Homosexual

2 (9.5)

--

1 (4.8)

Bisexual

1 (4.8)

1 (4.8)

3 (14.3)

Single

5 (23.8)

11 (52.4)

9 (42.9)

Dating

5 (23.8)

4 (19)

5 (23.8)

Living with Partner

4 (19)

2 (9.5)

1 (4.8)

Race

Sexual Orientation

Marital Status
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Married

5 (23.8)

1 (4.8)

3 (14.3)

Divorced

2 (9.5)

2 (9.5)

3 (14.3)

Remarried

--

1 (4.8)

--

High School Degree

3 (14.3)

7 (33.3)

2 (9.5)

College Degree

3 (14.3)

3 (14.3)

3 (14.3)

Graduate Degree

2 (9.5)

--

2 (9.5)

Some High School

11 (52.4)

1 (4.8)

--

Some College/Vocational --

10 (47.6)

13 (61.9)

Some Graduate School

2 (9.5)

--

1 (4.8)

$15,000 or less

11 (52.4)

6 (28.6)

4 (19)

$15,001 - $25,000

1 (4.8)

7 (33.3)

5 (23.8)

$25,001 - $35,000

--

--

3 (14.3)

$35,001 - $50,000

4 (19)

2 (9.5)

5 (23.8)

$50,001 or more

4 (19)

4 (19)

4 (19)

12 (57.1)

9 (42.9)

12 (57.1)

Education

Household Income

Mental Health Services

Note: Age = Control M = 34.19, SD = 13.53; Analytic M = 28.6, SD = 11.81; Concrete
M = 31.38, SD = 12.94.
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sensations (M difference = 17.14), though this difference was only trending toward
statistical significance, t(20) = 1.92, p = .069. Taken together, this may suggest that the
control group was more analytic than concrete in their processing style.
Trauma-Specific Perseverative Thinking
An adapted version of the CI (Davey & Levy, 1998; Vasey & Borkovec, 1992)
was used to generate the material for ratings of problematic (assimilated and overaccommodated) trauma beliefs. The interview involves asking participants to identify
their main current concern related to an event, in this case their index trauma (“What is
it that concerns you most about the [index trauma]?”). When the participant had named
their concern ‘X’; the interview started with the question “What is it that concerns you
most about X?” The answer Y was followed by the questions “What is it that concerns
you most about Y?” and so forth in an iterative fashion until the participant indicated
that they want to end the interview. Participants were instructed at the beginning of the
task that they could stop the interview when they had explored their concern but were
also reminded after 7, 14, and 21 answers or “steps” (if the participant reached that
many steps) that they could end the interview when they had reached their goal of
sufficiently exploring their concern. During the interview, participants were asked to
make each response no longer than a sentence so as to prevent the participant from
providing over-elaborated responses that might cover more than one concern.
The interview has been used successfully to assess the process and content of
repetitive thought by analyzing the number of steps that a participant goes through (i.e.,
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perseverative thinking) and the level of concreteness in answers provided during the
interview, respectively (Ehring et al., 2008; Stöber & Borkovec, 2002). For example,
increases in negative affectivity, including greater anxiety and sadness, have predicted a
greater number of steps completed during the interview (Johnston & Davey, 1997;
Startup & Davey, 2001). Other studies have found that answers in the interview are
characterized by physical, financial, and social threats (Vasey & Borkovec, 1992) and
problem-specific pessimism, personal inadequacy/incompetence, personal
despair/hopelessness, and the need to analyze a problem, which correlated with
measures of anxiety, depression, and poor problem-solving confidence (Davey & Levy,
1999). In fact, abstract, or less concrete, content during the interview is associated with
both general anxiety symptoms (Stöber & Borkovec, 2002) and posttraumatic stress
symptoms (Ehring et al., 2008).
Induction of Mood State
Participants underwent an induction of mood procedure at the conclusion of the
study to remove any potential negative residual effects elicited by thinking about their
index trauma. Previous meta-analyses have shown that watching movies or reading
stories are the most effective means for inducing both positive and sad moods
(Gerrards-Hesse, Spies, & Hesse, 1994; Westermann, Spies, Stahl, & Hesse, 1996). In
this study, one happy story was selected from a total of five stories pretested and rated
by five graduate students as the most uplifting. The stories were generated from actual
stories compiled by a division of NBC News. After reading the stories, pretest graduate
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students were asked to respond to the Mood Short Form (MSF; Peterson & Sauber,
1983/1993) to assess their mood states. The story ultimately chosen that elicited the
most positive mood state in the graduate students described a 76-year old grandmother
received her college degree after delaying her education for 42 years to raise a family
(see Appendix J). Participants were explicitly instructed to enter the mood state before
reading the story, as demand characteristics intensify mood induction (Westermann et
al., 1996).
Data Analysis Strategy
Coding
Frequency of (a) trauma intrusions during the TLP and (b) perseverative
thinking content with regard to problematic trauma beliefs during the CI were coded by
trained undergraduate research assistants. The research assistant coders were trained by
the PI and the Dissertation Director (DD). There were a coding team of three research
assistants for trauma intrusions and a different coding team of three research assistants
for problematic trauma beliefs. Coders completed several rounds of practice forms of
the respective variables before coding the participants’ TLP and CI. Coders were blind
to participants’ experimental condition and study hypotheses.
Trauma Intrusions
The PI and DD divided all thought listings into “thought units,” using the same
strategy across subjects, primarily using each clause as an individual thought. All
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thoughts were coded as either trauma-related or non-trauma-related by a team of three
undergraduate research assistants. Coders were provided with summaries of each
participant’s trauma experience in order to make accurate codings. Coders generated a
frequency score of trauma-related thoughts for each participant using consensus coding,
which was supervised by the PI. Individual variability in the number of thoughts listed
across participants was controlled by calculating the percentage of trauma-related
thoughts relative to all thoughts listed. The percentage score was used as the trauma
intrusion variable for this study.
Perseverative Thinking Content
A coding manual created by Sobel et al. (2009) to measure reliably and define
operationally accommodated and problematic (assimilated and over-accommodated)
trauma beliefs was used to code the thought content in the CI. For example,
accommodated statements are balanced, accurate evaluations of oneself, others, and the
world (e.g., “Even though I’ve made mistakes in the past, that doesn’t make me a bad
person”). Overgeneralizations about oneself, others, and the world (e.g., “No one can be
trusted.”) are coded as over-accommodated thoughts. Statements that suggest selfblame, denial, or attempts to change the event after the fact (e.g., “I should have fought
harder.”) are indicative of assimilation. Statements that do not fall into any of the
aforementioned categories were classified as informational statements (e.g.,
descriptions of the trauma, descriptions of emotional reactions, non-evaluative or
ambiguous statements).
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Coding decision rules were adopted based on the procedures outlined by Sobel
et al. (2009). For example, clauses rather than independent sentences were coded as
independent units or concerns because a single sentence could contain multiple
cognitions. Another decision rule involved inferring cognitions from the statements
provided by participants. Participants could express cognitions in the form of emotions
and/or behaviors. For instance, the statement “I feel that I cannot trust anyone,” suggests
emotion, but implies a cognition and can be restated as “I believe I cannot trust anyone
anymore.” Similarly, participants could express their beliefs in the form of behavioral
descriptions when stating, “I haven’t trusted others,” which is stated in the form of a
behavior, but implies the thought that “others cannot be trusted.” If thoughts were
clearly implied despite a participant’s use of non-cognitive language, the rule was to
code the statements as cognitions.
The manual contains examples of accommodated, over-accommodated, and
assimilated statements to aid coders in classifying ambiguous responses. For instance,
participants may make statements in question form, which can represent informational
statements or problematic beliefs. The question, “Why did this happen?” is considered
too ambiguous to be interpreted as a problematic belief, but the question, “Why don’t I
have any control?” implies perceived loss of power and was coded as an overaccommodated statement.
Independently, the PI and DD divided all sentences, or steps, in the CI into
“thought concerns,” using the same strategy across subjects, primarily using each clause
as an individual thought concern. All thought concerns were coded as problematic
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(assimilated or over-accommodated) trauma beliefs, accommodated trauma beliefs, or
informational statements by a team of three undergraduate research assistants. Coders
were provided with summaries of each participant’s trauma experience in order to make
accurate codings. For the purposes of this study, coders generated two frequency scores;
(1) the frequency of problematic trauma beliefs and (2) the frequency of accommodated
trauma beliefs for each participant using consensus coding, which was supervised by
the PI.
Individual variability in the number of concerns expressed across participants
was controlled by calculating the frequency of problematic trauma beliefs relative to the
total number of thought concerns reported by each participant. This percentage score
was used as the problematic trauma beliefs variable for this study. An additional
percentage score was created for accommodated trauma beliefs using the same method,
namely, calculating the frequency of accommodated trauma beliefs relative to the total
number of thought concerns reported by each participant.
Data Analysis
Statistical analyses were conducted with IBM SPSS version 21.0. An anxiety
total score was created by summing items from the BAI, and a negative affectivity total
score was created by summing items on the NA subscale of the PANAS-X. No data
points were missing on the variables of interest for the main analyses, and no univariate
outliers were detected based on visual inspection of data plots. Data analysis progressed
from descriptive statistical analysis (proportions, means, standard deviations) to
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hypothesis testing. Prior to inferential statistical analyses, assumptions of specific tests
were examined to justify their use when testing study hypotheses. Violations to
assumptions are reported in the results, and non-parametric tests were used when
appropriate, as opposed to transforming data, which is difficult to interpret and does not
always improve distributional properties. Alpha was set at .05 for all inferential
statistical analyses.
Inferential statistics mainly comprised correlation and analysis of variance
(ANOVA) statistical procedures. A mediation procedure based on nonparametric resampling known as bias-corrected bootstrapping (Shrout & Bolger, 2002) was
conducted to test the mediation model outlined in Hypotheses 10 and 11, namely, that
T2 trauma intrusions and negative affectivity, respectively, will mediate the relation
between problematic trauma beliefs expressed during a trauma-specific perseverative
thinking task and increased trauma intrusions. The bias-corrected bootstrapping
procedure is the most statistically powerful alternative to other mediation procedure
variations (Fritz & MacKinnon, 2007; MacKinnon, Lockwood, & Williams, 2004).
Bootstrapping allows one to gather many alternative versions of a single statistic
ordinarily only calculated from one sample. In regard to mediation, bootstrap data
resampling procedures establish confidence intervals for testing the statistical
significance of an indirect effect (Shrout & Bolger, 2002). This method allows the
distribution of aˆ × b ˆ to be examined empirically by randomly sampling observations
with replacement from the data set to create a pseudo (bootstrap) sample of N persons
and estimating aˆ × b ˆ for each bootstrap sample a total of J times (recommended to be
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10,000; Mallinckrodt, Abraham, Wei, & Russell, 2006). Examination of the distribution
of the estimated indirect effects from J bootstrap samples determines whether the
indirect effect of the predictor variable on the outcome variable is significant. If the
95% confidence interval does not contain zero, it can be concluded that the indirect
effect is significantly different than zero. The SPSS INDIRECT Macro that
accompanies Hayes (2012) was downloaded from www.quantpsy.org to conduct the
mediation analysis using bias-corrected bootstrapping. The analysis was based on
10,000 bootstrap iterations and the confidence interval was set to 95%, as recommended
by Mallinckrodt et al. (2006).
Until recently, researchers required large samples to test the significance of
indirect effects. Now, however, developments in statistical theory and the use of the
bootstrapping framework allow for testing direct and indirect effects in mediation
models when sample sizes are moderate or small, in the range of 20-80 cases (Efron &
Tibshirani, 1993; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). To aid researchers designing studies, Fritz
and MacKinnon (2007) present the necessary sample sizes for the six most common and
most recommended tests of mediation for various combinations of parameters.
According to Fritz and MacKinnon (2007), bias-corrected bootstrapping mediation
procedures require the smallest sample size among the six mediation models presented.
Given a coefficient that is moderate to large in magnitude (.59) for the a path, and a
coefficient that is moderate in magnitude (.39) for the b path, a minimum sample size of
54 is required to achieve .8 power. Shrout and Bolger (2002) indicate that when a causal
process is temporally proximal, such as in an experimental design, it is likely that the
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path coefficients will be moderate or large in magnitude. Thus, given the experimental
design of this study, one can expect moderate to large magnitude path coefficients, and
a sample size of 63 should be sufficient to run the proposed mediation models.

CHAPTER 3
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Prescreen
Women reported experiencing numerous and severe interpersonal traumas (see
Table 3). The modal interpersonal trauma reported among women was intimate partner
violence, reported by 82.54% of the sample (n = 52). Intimate partner violence was also
the most frequently reported index violent assault identified in the CI, reported by
44.44% of women (n = 28). Adult sexual assault was the second most frequently
reported index violent assault (19.05%, n = 12), followed by adolescent sexual assault
(13.70%, n = 8), child/adolescent physical abuse by caregivers (9.52%, n = 6), being
robbed with a weapon (6.35%, n = 4), witnessing family violence (3.17%, n = 2), and
being stalked (1.59%, n = 1). Two participants reported other types of violent assault
that fell into a different category: one reported being kidnapped with a weapon and held
hostage by a romantic partner for several days; the other reported being the victim of
attempted murder by a coworker when the male coworker locked her in an industrial
size baking oven at work and turned on the oven. Within each condition, index violent
events were distributed relatively evenly (see Table 4). The last time the index violent
event occurred averaged approximately 9.61 (SD = 9.81) years prior to the interview,
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Table 3
Percentage of Participants that Have Experienced an Interpersonal Traumatic Event (N
= 63)
______________________________________________________________________
Interpersonal Traumatic Event

Pre-screen
CI Index
n (% of sample) n (% of sample)
______________________________________________________________________
Item 8 (robbed with a weapon)
16 (25.40)
4 (6.35)
Item 9 (stranger physical assault)

17 (26.98)

0 (0)

Item 10 (witness community violence)

26 (41.27)

--

Item 11 (threatened)

46 (73.02)

--

Item 12 (child/adolescent physical abuse)

18 (28.57)

6 (9.52)

Item 13 (witness family violence)

36 (57.14)

2 (3.17)

Item 14 (intimate partner violence)

52 (82.54)

28 (44.44)

Item 15 (child sexual assault)

22 (34.92)

--

Item 16 (peer child sexual assault)

18 (28.57)

--Item 17

(adolescent sexual assault)

19 (30.16)

8 (12.70)

Item 18 (adult sexual assault)

19 (30.16)

12 (19.05)

Item 19 (unwanted sexual attention)

24 (38.10)

--

Item 20 (stalked)

35 (55.56)

1 (1.59)

Other

--

2 (3.17)

Note. Item 15: child sexual assault by someone who was at least five years older; Item
16: child sexual assault by someone approximately the same age. Two women reported
“other” types of assaultive violence: one reported being kidnapped by a romantic
partner; the other reported being the victim of attempted murder.
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Table 4
Percentage of Participants that Identified Index Worst Assault Within Each Condition
(N = 63)
______________________________________________________________________
Index Assault
Control
Analytic
Concrete
n (subsample %)
n (subsample %)
n (subsample %)
______________________________________________________________________
Robbed with a weapon
1 (4.76)
1 (4.76)
2 (9.52)
Adolescent physical abuse

2 (9.52)

2 (9.52)

2 (9.52)

Intimate partner violence

8 (38.10)

10 (47.62)

10 (47.62)

Adolescent sexual assault

4 (19.05)

2 (9.52)

2 (9.52)

Adult sexual assault

4 (19.05)

4 (19.05)

4 (19.05)

Witnessed family violence --

1 (4.76)

1 (4.76)

Stalked

1 (4.76)

--

--

Other (kidnapped)

1 (4.76)

--

--

Other (attempted murder)

--

1 (4.76)

--
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ranging from 3 months prior to 38 years. Many participants (n = 17, 27%) reported that
the index assault occurred within the last year, and the majority (n = 33, 52.4%)
reported that the index assault occurred within the last five years. Group differences did
emerge with regard to time since the index violent event last occurred, F 3(2,55.66) =
3.54, p = .036. Specifically, Games-Howell post-hoc comparisons revealed that women
in the control condition reported that their index violent event occurred longer ago than
women in the analytic rumination condition (M difference = 7.71, p = .029).
Time 1 (Premanipulation)
Before the modes of processing experimental manipulation and the traumaspecific perseverative thinking task, the average anxiety score on the BAI was 5.22 (SD
= 7.15; see Table 5), ranging from 0 to 44, which suggests a “minimal level of anxiety.”
Mean item ratings on the BAI are indicative of anxiety symptoms that are “mildly (it
does not bother me very much)” to “moderately (it is very unpleasant, but I can stand
it)” bothersome at the moment of report. The average negative affectivity score on the
PANAS-X was 14.16 (SD = 4.86), ranging from 10 to 31. This is similar to
undergraduates who reported their negative affectivity in the present moment, but lower
than scores in a sample of VA substance abusers (M = 23.7, SD = 10.1; t(62) = 15.58, p
< .001) and psychiatric inpatients (M = 21.1, SD = 9.0; t(62) = 11.33, p < .001; Watson
& Clark, 1994). With regard to trauma intrusions, the majority of women (85.70%,
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The assumption of homogeneity of variances was violated, therefore, the Brown-Forsythe F test was
used, as it is not sensitive to differences in variances across groups. The Brown-Forsythe F statistic
results from an ordinary one-way ANOVA on the absolute deviations from the median.

10 (10)
0 (0)
0

Negative Affect

Trauma Intrusions

Trauma Beliefs

83.33

35.29 (58.82)

31 (39)

44 (54)

13.49

2.07 (7.62)*

14.16 (15.63)†

5.22 (8.30)*

19.06

6.37 (12.65)

4.86 (6.47)

7.15 (9.85)

ΔMean †p<.07, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

______________________________________________________________________________________________________

0 (0)

Anxiety

Variable
T1 Minimum (T2)
T1 Maximum (T2) T1 Mean (T2)
T1 Standard Deviation (T2)
______________________________________________________________________________________________________

Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Variables (N = 63)
______________________________________________________________________________________________________

Table 5
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n = 54) did not report any trauma intrusions during the first TLP. Of the 14.30% of
women who did report trauma intrusions, the frequency of trauma intrusions relative to
other thoughts listed during the first TLP ranged from 3.45% (n = 1) to 35.29% (n = 1).
Problematic Trauma Beliefs During Perseverative Thinking
On average, women went through 15.13 (SD = 11.25) “steps” on the CI, ranging
from 0 to 63. The number of steps completed on the CI did not differ as a function of
experimental condition, F(2,62) = 0.42, p = 661. The total number of clauses
participants reported ranged from 0 to 82 (M = 20.46, SD = 16.87), and also did not
differ as a function of study condition, F(2, 62) = 0.85, p = .432. The majority of
participants expressed problematic trauma beliefs during the perseverative thinking task
(54%, n = 34; see Table 6). Of the women who did report problematic trauma beliefs,
the frequency of problematic trauma beliefs relative to other thoughts expressed during
the CI ranged from 2.27% (n = 1) to 83.33% (n = 1), with the average interview
consisting of 24.42% (SD = 19.32) problematic trauma beliefs.
Time 2 (Postmanipulation)
After the modes of processing experimental manipulation and the traumaspecific perseverative thinking interview, the average anxiety score on the BAI was
8.30 (SD = 9.85), ranging from 0 to 54, which suggests “mild anxiety.” Mean item

11 (17.46%)

Note: IPV = intimate partner violence; SA = sexual assault; CPA = child/adolescent physical abuse.

IPV
SA

“Well, it was like, I didn’t deserve what I got” (P21)

IPV

“Never trusting anyone, ever again” (P45)

IPV

“Well, I know this is not my fault” (P16)

“I still feel like everything’s my fault” (P7)

CPA

SA

“It couldn’t have went on for so long, if I confronted it sooner” (P6)

SA

“I didn’t do anything wrong to be treated that way” (P49)
“Um, for a long time I wondered if perhaps I was a target. As I’ve gotten
older, I’ve come to realize I’m not a target” (P20)
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Accommodated

“I should’ve realized he wasn’t going to change from the first time” (P4)

IPV

Type of Belief
n (%)
Assault
Quote (participant ID)
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Problematic
34 (54%)

Sample Trauma Beliefs Expressed During the CI (N=63)
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Table 6
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ratings on the BAI are indicative of anxiety symptoms that are “moderately (it is very
unpleasant, but I can stand it)” to “severely (I can barely stand it)” bothersome at the
current moment of reporting. The average negative affectivity score on the PANAS-X
was 15.63 (SD = 6.47), ranging from 10 to 39. This is similar to undergraduates who
reported their negative affectivity in the present moment, but lower than a sample of
VA substance abusers (t(62) = 9.90, p < .001) and psychiatric inpatients (t(62) = 6.71, p
< .001; Watson & Clark, 1994). With regard to trauma intrusions, the majority of
women (55%, n = 33) once again did not report any trauma intrusions during the second
TLP. Of the 45% of women who did report trauma intrusions, the frequency of trauma
intrusions relative to other thoughts listed during the second TLP ranged from 2.94% (n
= 1) to 58.82% (n = 1).
Hypothesis Testing
To test Predictions 1, 2, and 3; namely, that there will be no difference among
conditions on T1 anxiety, T1 negative affectivity, and T1 trauma intrusions,
respectively, three separate one-way ANOVAs were conducted. As expected, there
were no significant group differences on T1 anxiety (F[2, 60] = 0.31, p = .733), T1
negative affectivity (F(2, 60) = 0.70, p = .499), or T1 trauma intrusions (F[2, 37.82] =
0.97, p = .388).
To test hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, namely, that there will be significant increases
from T1 to T2 in anxiety, negative affectivity, and trauma intrusions, respectively, three
separate 3x2 mixed-factorial ANOVAs were conducted. The between-subjects variable
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was group condition (analytic, concrete, and control) and the within-subjects variable
was time (pre- and post- trauma-specific perseverative thinking task). Descriptive
statistics for T2 anxiety, T2 negative affectivity, and T2 trauma intrusions for each
group condition are reported in Table 7. As expected, anxiety increased significantly
from T1 to T2, F(1, 60) = 11.55, p = .001 (see Figure 1). However, inconsistent with
Hypothesis 2, the significant increase in anxiety from T1 to T2 did not differ by group,
F(2, 60) = 0.51, p = .606. Simple contrasts revealed that there was a greater increase in
anxiety among women in the analytic condition compared to women in the control
condition (Contrast Estimate = 1.76), but this difference was not significant (p = .471).
It was also observed that there was a greater increase in anxiety among women in the
concrete condition compared to women in the control condition (Contrast Estimate =
2.81), but, again, this difference was not significant (p = .252).
With regard to negative affectivity, as expected, negative affectivity increased
from T1 to T2, though this difference was only marginally significant, F(1, 60) = 2.84,
p = .097 (see Figure 2). Again, inconsistent with Hypothesis 4, the increase in negative
affectivity from T1 to T2 did not differ by group, F(2, 60) = 0.29, p = .751. Simple
contrasts revealed that there was a greater increase in negative affectivity among
women in the analytic condition compared to women in the control condition (Contrast
Estimate = 2.05), but this difference was not significant (p = .152). It was also observed
that there was a greater increase in negative affectivity among women in the concrete
condition compared to women in the control condition (Contrast Estimate = 0.86), but
this difference was not significant (p = .546).
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Table 7
Descriptive Statistics of T2 Continuous Variables by Condition (N = 63)
______________________________________________________________________
Variable
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Standard
Deviation
______________________________________________________________________
Analytic (n = 21)
Trauma Beliefs

0

42.86

9.77

13.75

Anxiety

0

38

8.76

10.21

Negative Affectivity

10

39

16.76

8.28

Trauma Intrusions

0

58.82

8.94

16.39

Trauma Beliefs

0

83.33

15.61

22.93

Anxiety

0

16

6.14

5.19

Negative Affectivity

10

22

14.24

3.86

Trauma Intrusions

0

33.33

7.61

11.65

Trauma Beliefs

0

60

14.16

18.66

Anxiety

0

54

10

12.69

Negative Affectivity

10

39

15.90

6.54

Trauma Intrusions

0

31.25

6.31

9.40

Control (n = 21)

Concrete (n = 21)

______________________________________________________________________
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Figure 1. Mean T2 anxiety scores pre- and post- trauma-specific perseverative thinking
task as a function of group condition.
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Figure 2. Mean T2 negative affectivity pre- and post- trauma-specific perseverative
thinking task as a function of group condition.

72
With regard to trauma intrusions, as expected, trauma intrusions increased
significantly from T1 to T2, F(1, 60) = 11.46, p = .001 (see Figure 3). Inconsistent with
Hypothesis 6, the increase in trauma intrusions from T1 to T2 did not differ by group,
F(2, 60) = 0.06, p = .946. Simple contrasts revealed that there was a greater increase in
trauma intrusions among women in the analytic condition compared to women in the
control condition (Contrast Estimate = 1.84), but this difference was not significant (p =
.444). It was also observed that there was a greater increase in trauma intrusions among
women in the control condition compared to women in the concrete condition (Contrast
Estimate = 0.67), though this difference was, once again, not significant (p = .780).
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to test Hypothesis 5, that problematic
trauma beliefs expressed during the trauma-specific perseverative thinking task would
be most prevalent for analytic ruminators, followed by controls, followed by concrete
ruminators. Contrary to this hypothesis, there were no significant group differences in
problematic trauma beliefs (F(2, 60) = 0.55, p = .582) between analytic ruminators (M =
9.77, SD = 13.75), controls (M = 15.61, SD = 22.93), or concrete ruminators (M =
14.16, SD = 18.66). Additionally, no group condition was more likely than the others to
express problematic trauma beliefs (χ2 (2, N = 63) = 0.90, p = .639).
To test Hypotheses 4 and 6, that both T2 anxiety and T2 negative affectivity
would be positively associated with T2 trauma intrusions, and that problematic trauma
beliefs would be positively associated with T2 anxiety, T2 negative affectivity, and T2
trauma intrusions, correlation analyses were conducted (see Table 8). T2 anxiety was
not associated with T2 intrusions (r(63) = .21, p = .103), but T2 negative affectivity was

73

Figure 3. Mean T2 trauma intrusions pre- and post- trauma-specific perseverative
thinking task as a function of group condition.
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Table 8
Correlation Matrix of T2 Variables (N=63)
______________________________________________________________________
1
2
3
4
______________________________________________________________________
1. Trauma Beliefs

--

2. Anxiety

.23†

--

3. NA

.18

.66***

4. Trauma Intrusions

.16

.21

-.27*

--

______________________________________________________________________
†p<.07, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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positively associated with T2 trauma intrusions (r(60) = .27, p = .035). T2 negative
affectivity accounted for 7.29% of the variance in trauma intrusions reported after the
trauma-specific perseverative thinking interview. See Table 9 for a breakdown of
correlation analyses among study variables across experimental conditions.
With regard to problematic trauma beliefs expressed during the trauma-specific
perseverative thinking task, there was a marginally significant positive relation to T2
anxiety (r(63) = .23, p = .066) but no significant relation to T2 negative affectivity
(r(63) = .18, p = .166) or T2 trauma intrusions (r(63) = .16, p = .198).
To test whether T2 anxiety and T2 negative affectivity mediate the relation
between problematic trauma beliefs and T2 trauma intrusions (Hypotheses 7 and 8), two
separate mediation procedures (see Figures 4 and 5) based on nonparametric resampling (i.e., bias-corrected bootstrapping; Shrout & Bolger, 2002) were performed.
When examining T2 anxiety as a mediator (see Table 10), the true indirect effect was
estimated to be .028 (standard error = .025) and lie between -.016 and .188, with 95%
confidence. The 95% confidence interval spans zero, suggesting a non-significant
indirect effect that is inconsistent with Hypothesis 10. That is, T2 anxiety did not
significantly mediate the relation between problematic trauma beliefs and T2 trauma
intrusions. The same held true for T2 negative affectivity as a mediator (see Table 11).
The true indirect effect of T2 negative affectivity was estimated to be .029 (standard
error = .025) and lie between -.007 and .205, with 95% confidence. The 95%
confidence interval spans zero, suggesting a nonsignificant indirect effect, and is
inconsistent with
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Table 9
Correlation Matrix of T2 Variables by Condition (N=63)
______________________________________________________________________
1
2
3
4
______________________________________________________________________
Analytic (n = 21)
1. Trauma Beliefs

--

2. Anxiety

.66**

--

3. NA

.43†

.85***

--

4. Trauma Intrusions

.23

.48*

.42†

--

Control (n = 21)
1. Trauma Beliefs

--

2. Anxiety

.08

--

3. NA

.19

.80***

--

4. Trauma Intrusions

.06

.33

.36

--

Concrete (n = 21)
1. Trauma Beliefs

--

2. Anxiety

.15

--

3. NA

.06

.54*

4. Trauma Intrusions

.33

-.16

--.11

--

______________________________________________________________________
†p<.06, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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T2 Anxiety
a path

b path

.12

.23

Problematic Trauma
Beliefs

c path (without mediator)
.11

T2 Trauma Intrusions

c’ path (with mediator)
.08

Figure 4. Hypothesized model of the indirect effect of T2 negative affectivity on the relation
between problematic trauma beliefs and T2 trauma intrusions.
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a path

T2 Negative
Affectivity

.06

Problematic Trauma
Beliefs

b path
.48

c path (without mediator)
.11

T2 Trauma Intrusions

c’ path (with mediator)
.08

Figure 5. Hypothesized model of the indirect effect of T2 anxiety on the relation
between problematic trauma beliefs and T2 trauma intrusions.
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Table 10
Linear Regression Analyses Testing T2 Anxiety as a Mediator of the Relation between
Problematic Trauma Beliefs and Trauma Intrusions (N=63)
______________________________________________________________________
B
SE B
β
______________________________________________________________________
IV to Mediator (a path):
Outcome: T2 Anxiety
Predictor: Problematic Trauma Beliefs

.12

.07

1.87†

.23

.17

1.39

.11

.09

1.30

.08

.09

0

Mediator to DV (b path):
Outcome: T2 Trauma Intrusions
Predictor: T2 Anxiety
Total Effect of IV on DV (c path)
Outcome: T2 Trauma Intrusions
Predictor: T2 Anxiety
Direct Effect of IV on DV (c’ path)
Outcome: T2 Trauma Intrusions
Mediator: T2 Anxiety
Predictor: Problematic Trauma Beliefs

Note. Adj. R² = .03. Bias-corrected point estimate = .0282 (SE = .0250, 95% biascorrected bootstrap confidence interval = -.0010 to .1876). IV = independent variable;
DV = dependent variable. †<.07

80
Table 11
Linear Regression Analyses Testing T2 Negative Affectivity as a Mediator of the
Relation between Problematic Trauma Beliefs and Trauma Intrusions (N=63)
______________________________________________________________________
B
SE B
β
______________________________________________________________________
IV to Mediator (a path):
Outcome: T2 Negative Affectivity
Predictor: Problematic Trauma Beliefs

.06

.04

1.40

.48

.25

1.95†

.11

.09

1.30

.08

.09

0.97

Mediator to DV (b path):
Outcome: T2 Trauma Intrusions
Predictor: T2 Negative Affectivity
Total Effect of IV on DV (c path)
Outcome: T2 Trauma Intrusions
Predictor: T2 Negative Affectivity
Direct Effect of IV on DV (c’ path)
Outcome: T2 Trauma Intrusions
Mediator: T2 Negative Affectivity
Predictor: Problematic Trauma Beliefs

Note. Adj. R² = .05. Point estimate = .0292 (SE = .0254, 95% bias-corrected bootstrap
confidence interval = -.0068 to .2048). IV = independent variable; DV = dependent
variable. †<.06
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Hypothesis 11. That is, T2 negative affectivity did not significantly mediate the relation
between problematic trauma beliefs and T2 trauma intrusions.

CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION
The aim of the present study was to investigate ruminative processes that may
be relevant to posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) using theories of depressive
rumination as frameworks for exploring ruminative content and ruminative mechanisms
implicated in the maintenance of and recovery from posttraumatic stress. Specifically,
the effects of “analytic” rumination (brooding, conceptualizing/doing) and “concrete”
rumination (mindful, experiencing/being) on analogue PTSD symptoms of trauma
beliefs, anxiety, negative affectivity, and trauma intrusions were examined. The results
of the present study support, challenge, and extend previous research on posttraumatic
rumination.
Ruminative Content
With regard to the content expressed during a trauma-specific perseverative
thinking interview (i.e, the CI), it was observed that the majority (54%) of participants
expressed problematic (i.e., assimilated or overaccomodated) trauma beliefs. In those
who expressed problematic trauma beliefs, the average interview comprised
approximately one quarter of problematic trauma beliefs, but ranged up to
approximately 83% of the interview consisting of problematic trauma beliefs. This is
consistent with Steil and Ehlers (2000), who found that 29% of the variance in
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rumination among a sample of trauma survivors was represented by problematic trauma
beliefs. Problematic trauma beliefs expressed by this sample of participants replicated
categories identified by Steil and Ehlers (2000); namely, beliefs of personal change
(“I’m not independent, I’m weak, I can’t take care of myself”; Participant 54), justice
(“I feel that I’m trustworthy so everyone should be, uh, have some values about
themselves and care, care about the next person”; Participant 34), personal
responsibility (“I feel like everything’s my fault”; Participant 7), and future danger
(“I’m terrified it’s going to happen again”; Participant 3).
This sample of participants also expressed accommodated trauma beliefs during
the trauma-specific perseverative thinking interview, though this was less common
relative to other thoughts expressed, such as problematic trauma beliefs and information
statements. Approximately 17.5% of participants expressed accommodated trauma
beliefs. In those who expressed accommodated trauma beliefs, the average interview
comprised approximately 5% of accommodated trauma beliefs and ranged to 9% of the
interview. Upon inspection of content, accommodated trauma beliefs were mostly
representative of recognition that the assault was not the participant’s fault (“Um, for a
long time, I wondered if perhaps I was a target. As I’ve gotten older, I’ve come to
realize that I’m not a target”; Participant 20) and that the participant deserved fair
treatment from others (“I guess ‘cause she doesn’t see that I can be a good person, and I
do deserve love, and I do deserve to be cared about, and that my happiness does
matter”; Participant 43).
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With these observations in mind, there may be a few reasons for the greater
prevalence of problematic trauma beliefs in comparison to accommodated trauma
beliefs during the perseverative thinking interview. It may be that the problematic
trauma beliefs expressed during the interview triggered a cycle of perseverativing on
negative trauma appraisals from which participants had difficulty disconnecting,
whereas accommodated trauma beliefs expressed during the interview partially resolved
preexisting negative trauma inferences, which allowed participants to focus on other
aspects of the trauma. Additionally, demand characteristics of the prompt during the CI
(“What is it that concerns you most about [index trauma]”) may have elicited more
problematic trauma beliefs in comparison to accommodated trauma beliefs.
Ruminative Mechanisms
Before completing the trauma-specific perseverative thinking interview,
participants underwent a rumination style induction (analytic, concrete, or control).
During the training of these conditions, participants were asked to rate what proportion
of their thoughts were focused on analyzing thoughts (“trying to understand, explain, or
make sense of things”) or on the concreteness of thoughts (“concrete objects, feelings,
and sensations”). Results suggest that the concrete condition was working as desired.
That is, women in the concrete rumination condition, compared to women in the
analytic rumination condition, reported that they were more focused on concreteness of
thoughts, and women within the concrete condition reported that they were more
focused on concreteness of thoughts than analyzing thoughts. However, it did not
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appear that the analytic rumination condition was working as desired. Although women
in the analytic rumination condition reported that they were more focused on analyzing
thoughts compared to women in the concrete condition, this did not reach statistical
significance. Additionally, there was no difference in the proportion of thoughts that
were focused on analyzing compared to concreteness of thoughts among women within
the analytic rumination condition. It may be that the analytic induction was not strong
enough to achieve a significant difference in processing at an analytic versus concrete
level. Alternatively, this may have been a result of the participants self-reporting their
subjective experience of processing style. There were a few instances when women in
the analytic condition reported that 100% of their thoughts were focused on processing
at both a concrete and analytic level. Thus, this manipulation check may have been less
sensitive to true, objective differences in processing style. With regard to the control
condition, both within- and between-condition results suggest that women in the control
condition had a greater tendency toward analyzing thoughts than on the concreteness of
thoughts.
When examining between-subject effects on ruminative content expressed
during the trauma-specific perseverative thinking interview, no group difference in
expressed problematic trauma beliefs was observed. The null result observed with
regard to no group differences in expressed problematic trauma beliefs may have
resulted from the fact that the analytic rumination induction was not working as
designed, as suggested by the manipulation check. It was hypothesized that analytic
ruminators would express the highest proportion of problematic beliefs during the
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perseverative thinking interview in comparison to the other two conditions, but this
effect may have not been achieved because the analytic induction was not successful.
Thus, as Cronbach and Meehl (1955) have suggested, the fact that no group differences
were observed may have been a result of the experimental design failing to test the
hypotheses properly, and future research using a different experimental manipulation is
warranted.
Rumination and Analogue PTSD Symptoms
Results revealed that after the rumination induction and trauma-specific
perseverative thinking interview, analogue PTSD symptoms increased from baseline
(i.e., pre-rumination induction). Specifically, there were no group differences in
anxiety, negative affectivity, or trauma intrusions at baseline, but after perseverating on
the index trauma, anxiety and trauma intrusions increased significantly, and negative
affectivity trended toward an increase. However, inconsistent with hypotheses, there
were no group differences in these increases. This may suggest that revisiting a trauma
memory and perseverating on its consequences and implications increases posttraumatic
stress symptom reports, though the type of ruminative processing one engages in does
not differentiate the degree of increase in these symptoms.
Correlation analyses between analogue PTSD symptoms revealed that negative
affectivity, but not anxiety, was associated with trauma intrusions post-trauma
perseveration. Additionally, although problematic trauma beliefs were associated with
neither negative affectivity nor trauma intrusions, a marginally significant, positive
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relation between problematic trauma beliefs and anxiety was found. These null findings,
as suggested by Chronbach and Meehl (1955), may be a result of an incorrect theory,
specifically the Processing-Modes Theory (Teasdale, 1999) in this case. Alternatively,
the nonclinical sample utilized for this study may have affected the degree of
association between the study variables.
Given the null results from the correlation analyses among analogue PTSD
symptoms, it is not surprising that when examining indirect effects, problematic trauma
beliefs and trauma intrusions were not associated through the indirect effects of anxiety
and negative affectivity.
Limitations
Although this study sheds some light on understanding ruminative processes in
posttraumatic stress, there are inherent limitations. PTSD was not assessed in this
sample; therefore, it is unknown whether the results of this study are generalizable to
clinical populations. It may be that the potentially subclinical individuals represented in
this sample were not experiencing posttraumatic symptoms that were clinically
significant enough to be manipulated with the processing modes induction, which may
have accounted for the null findings with regard to processing mode group differences
and relation among analogue PTSD symptoms. On a related note, although the
ruminative processing style induction was an analogue “intervention,” the intervention
may have been too limited in time such that the time period between delivering the
induction and assessing analogue PTSD symptoms was too short to observe symptom
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fluctuations. Symptom changes may be better assessed after repeated delivery of the
analogue intervention and a greater lag time for the symptom assessment. Additionally,
despite power calculations, the sample size may have not had sufficient power to detect
true relations between ruminative processing styles and analogue PTSD symptoms,
particularly in the absence of a strong manipulation. Furthermore, the inclusionary
criteria for this study, although somewhat restrictive, allowed for the representation of a
diverse group of assaultive violence survivors. This study was not able to control for the
specific type of trauma (e.g., sexual assault versus physical assault), the severity of
trauma, and other characteristics (e.g., victim-perpetrator relationship). These variables
may have influenced distress levels during the experiment and subsequent symptom
reports.
The measures used in this study are also limited in several ways. The BAI (Beck
& Steer, 1993) is intended as a measure of “prolonged state anxiety” and for use with
clinical populations. Although it was chosen over other measures of state anxiety, such
as the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger; Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, &
Jacobs, 1983), and because it is less contaminated by depressive content (Beck et al.,
1998), it was observed that many participants reported zero to few symptoms on the
BAI. Thus, the BAI may have been less sensitive to immediate anxiety symptoms in
this sample and not able to fully capture subjective anxiety during the experiment.
Additionally, the TLP (Cacioppo et al., 1997) was used to capture intrusive thoughts of
trauma, but it is unknown whether those who were more avoidant of trauma stimuli
simply did not report experiencing such thoughts on the TLP, even though they may
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have been experiencing and suppressing them. Furthermore, demand characteristics
during the second TLP (“It is OK to think about absolutely anything [including your
traumatic experience].”) may have inflated the true point estimate of spontaneous
trauma intrusions, and should be interpreted with caution.
Future Studies
Given the limitations of this study, improvement in methodology would allow
for further delineation of the relations between ruminative processing styles and
analogue PTSD symptoms. For example, there are ways in which the rumination
processing style induction could be amended, and there are several other ruminative
processing style inductions that have been used with clinically depressed and nondepressed samples (e.g., Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004), which can be implemented
to examine the effects of processing on posttraumatic stress symptoms among trauma
survivors. For example, instead of having participants focus on 30, potentially irrelevant
scenarios during the induction, it may be more salient for participants to focus on their
specific index trauma for a certain time limit to orient their thought content to
something that is more central to their lived experience and symptomatology. In terms
of a different rumination induction, Moberly and Watkins (2006) presented participants
with 12 scenarios, having them concentrate on each for one minute and then write down
answers to each scenario for another minute. In the concrete condition, participants
were presented with pictures of the 12 scenarios to induce a more concrete and visual
imagery-based approach to the situation. In the analytic condition, participants were
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asked to think about the causes, meanings, and implications of each situation, with
reference to a brief written description of the situation to induce a more analytic,
abstract-implicational approach to the situation. The difference in presentation style
within this type of manipulation may have been stronger for inducing various
processing styles. Additionally, Moberly and Watkins (2006) had independent raters
code the degree to which participants were focused on concreteness of thoughts versus
analyzing thoughts, which may have been more sensitive to capturing true, objective
differences during the manipulation check.
Additionally, a mediation model examining anxiety and negative affectivity as
the indirect effects between problematic trauma beliefs and trauma intrusions,
especially among those who undergo an analytic rumination induction, could be
analyzed with a larger sample. According to Fritz and McKinnon (2007), with the
moderate to large effect sizes that were observed among the variables in the a and b
paths of the mediation model within the analytic rumination condition, approximately
13 to 50 more participants would be required to achieve .8 power to run a bias-corrected
bootstrap mediation analysis.
Future studies might also examine dispositional characteristics such as trait
mindfulness or trait brooding that could potentially enhance the effects of certain
ruminative processing styles and subsequent recovery and/or maintenance of
posttraumatic stress. For example, Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1991) found that
participants who had a negative brooding ruminative response style before the
occurrence of a natural disaster showed higher levels of PTSD symptoms in the 10 days

91
after the natural disaster compared to those participants with a less brooding ruminative
response style. It may be that the concrete rumination induction and analytic rumination
induction were more potent for those who were more mindful or analytic in their trait
characteristics, respectively. If so, this may suggest that people with certain trait
characteristics may be more amenable to treatments that emphasize certain ruminative
processing components, and clients could be matched to treatments accordingly.
Sampling from clinical populations may also enhance the generalizability of
results to individuals who are suffering from more severe forms of PTSD. Additionally,
as suggested by several researches who have examined mindfulness-based treatments as
adjuncts to individual therapy (e.g., Kearney et al., 2012; Kimbrough et al., 2010; King
et al., 2013), research should begin to examine mindfulness-based treatments such as
MBSR and MBCT as stand-alone treatments for posttraumatic stress symptoms. Within
such a treatment study, it may also be useful to look at associated symptoms such as
depression, somatization, and sleep disturbance to understand if and how mindfulnessbased treatments contribute to these symptoms and their interrelations with
posttraumatic stress. Similarly, research should examine the effectiveness of
mindfulness-based treatments as a prelude to traditional first-line treatments for PTSD
such as CPT and PE. It may be of interest to examine whether participating in a
mindfulness-based group treatment before receiving CPT or PE increases their efficacy.
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Prescreen
1. Assess exposure to interpersonal trauma and exclusionary criteria
Online Questionnaires
1. Trauma history (TLEQ; Kubany et al., 2000)
Research Session
1. Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck & Steer, 1993)
2. Negative Affectivity (PANAS-X; Watson & Clark, 1999)
3. Trauma Intrusions (TLP; Cacioppo et al., 1997)
4. Processing Mode Induction (Watkins et al., 2008)
5. Catastrophizing Interview (CI; Davey & Levy, 1998; Vasey & Borkovec,
1992)
6. Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck & Steer, 1993)
7. Negative Affectivity (PANAS-X; Watson & Clark, 1999)
8. Trauma Intrusions (TLP; Cacioppo et al., 1997)
9. Induction of Positive Mood State Story
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The purpose of this questionnaire is to identify important life experiences that can affect a
person’s emotional well-being or later quality of life. The events listed below are far more
common than people realize. Please read each question carefully and mark the answers that
best describe your experience.
1. Have you been robbed or been present during a robbery-where the robber(s) used or
displayed a weapon?
never__
once__
more than 5 times__

twice__

3 times__

4 times__

5 times__

2. Have you been hit or beaten up and badly hurt by a stranger or by someone you didn’t
know very well?
never__
once__
more than 5 times__

twice__

3 times__

4 times__

5 times__

3. Have you seen a stranger (or someone you didn’t know very well) attack or beat up
someone and seriously injure or kill them?
never__
once__
more than 5 times__

twice__

3 times__

4 times__

5 times__

4. Has anyone threatened to kill you or cause you serious physical harm?
never__
once__
more than 5 times__

twice__

3 times__

4 times__

5 times__

5. While you were growing up: Were you physically punished in a way that resulted in
bruises, burns, cuts, or broken bones?
never__
once__
more than 5 times__

twice__

3 times__

4 times__

5 times___

6. While growing up: Did you see or hear family violence? (such as your father hitting your
mother, or any family member beating up or inflicting bruises, burns or cuts on another
family member)
never__
once__
more than 5 times__

twice__

3 times__

4 times__

5 times__
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7. Have you ever been slapped, punched, kicked, beaten up, or otherwise physically hurt by
your spouse (or former spouse), a boyfriend/girlfriend, or some other intimate partner?
never__
once__
more than 5 times__

twice__

3 times__

4 times__

5 times__

th

8. Before your 13 birthday: Did anyone – who was at least five years older than you –
touch or fondle your body in a sexual way or make you touch or fondle their body in a
sexual way?
never__
once__
more than 5 times__

twice__

3 times__

4 times__

5 times__

th

9. Before your 13 birthday: Did anyone close to your age touch sexual parts of your body
or make you touch sexual parts of their body against your will or without your consent?
never__
once__
more than 5 times__

twice__

th

3 times__

4 times__

5 times__

th

10. After your 13 birthday and before your 18 birthday: Did anyone touch sexual parts of
your body or make you touch sexual parts of their body – against your will or without your
consent?
never__
once__
more than 5 times__

twice__

3 times__

4 times__

5 times__

th

11. After your 18 birthday: Did anyone touch sexual parts of your body or make you touch
sexual parts of their body – against your will or without your consent?
never__
once__
more than 5 times__

twice__

3 times__

4 times__

5 times__

12. Were you ever subjected to uninvited or unwanted sexual attention (other than sexual
contact discussed in previous questions)?
never__
once__
more than 5 times__

twice__

3 times__

4 times__

5 times__

13. Has anyone ever stalked you – in other words: followed you or kept track of your
activities – causing you to feel intimidated or concerned for your safety?
never__
once__
more than 5 times__

twice__

3 times__

4 times__

5 times__
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14. Please identify the most distressing, worst, or most severe event you experienced
(choose only one):
a. Being robbed or present during a robbery-where the robber(s) used or displayed a
weapon.
b. Being hit or beaten up and badly hurt by a stranger or someone you didn’t know
very well.
c. Seeing a stranger (or someone you didn’t know very well) attack or beat up
someone and seriously injure or kill them.
d. While growing up, being physically punished in a way that resulted in bruises,
burns, cuts, or broken bones.
e. While growing up, seeing or hearing family violence (such as your father hitting
your mother, or any family member beating up or inflicting bruises, burns or cuts on
another family member.
f. Being slapped, punched, kicked, beaten up, or otherwise physically hurt by your
spouse (or former spouse), a boyfriend/girlfriend, or some other intimate partner.
g. Before your 18th birthday, someone touching sexual parts of your body or making
you touch sexual parts of their body- against your will or without your consent.
h. After your 18th birthday, someone touching sexual parts of your body or making
you touch sexual parts of their body- against your will or without your consent.
i. Being subjected to uninvited or unwanted sexual attention (other than the sexual
contact discussed in previous questions).
j. Being stalked-someone following you or keeping track of your activities- causing
you to feel intimated or concerned for your safety.
15. When was the last time the event that you identified in question 14 occurred?
___ Less than 3 months ago
___ 3 months to 6 months ago
___ 6 months to 1 year ago
___ 1 year to 2 years ago
___ 2 years to 5 years ago
___ More than 5 years ago
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Participant ID #: _______________________
Describe the survey briefly:
“We are inviting women to participate in interviews at the NIU Center for the Study of
Family Violence about adverse life events and mental health. The interview will take
approximately 2 hours to complete and will be split into two different sessions. The first
session involves completing self-report questionnaires about adverse life events you
have experienced in your childhood and adulthood, and about how you think about
them. If you do not have access to the internet or a computer, you are invited to come to
the research lab where we can provide access to a computer. The second session
involves coming to the research lab where you will be asked to fill out questionnaires
about your mood, thoughts, and different aspects of your thinking about adverse life
events. We’re hoping that these interviews can help us develop better programs and
intervention for women who have had experiences similar to your own. The interview
does ask some questions that may be difficult to answer or think about, and we
encourage participants to skip questions as they need to. You can also withdraw from
the interview at any time. Most interviews will take place at the Center for the Study of
Family Violence and Sexual Assault, and we can provide childcare at no charge to you.
If you decide to participate, you will receive $40 compensation at the end of your
participation in the study. This includes $10 for completing the first session, which
should take approximately 30 minutes, and $30 for completing the second session,
which should take approximately one and a half hours.”
1. Would you be willing to complete the 2 hour study?
2.
a. If yes, how old are you?
b. If yes, would you be willing to come to NIU?
c. If yes, do you require childcare during the interview?
_____

Yes No
____
Yes No
Yes No

If yes, how many children do you have that will require childcare?:

Gender and ages of children requiring childcare:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
3. I am going to ask you if you have experienced a number of difficult or stressful
things that sometimes happen to people. For each event, let me know whether it has
happened to you personally (circle all that apply):
a. Have you been robbed or been present during a robbery-where the robber(s)
used or displayed a weapon?
b. Have you been hit or beaten up and badly hurt by a stranger or by someone
you didn’t know very well?
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c. Have you seen a stranger (or someone you didn’t know very well) attack or
beat up someone and seriously injure or kill them?
d. Has anyone threatened to kill you or cause you serious physical harm?
e. While you were growing up: Were you physically punished in a way that
resulted in bruises, burns, cuts, or broken bones?
f. While growing up: Did you see or hear family violence? (such as your father
hitting your mother, or any family member beating up or inflicting bruises,
burns or cuts on another family member)
g. Have you ever been slapped, punched, kicked, beaten up, or otherwise
physically hurt by your spouse (or former spouse), a boyfriend/girlfriend, or
some other intimate partner?
h. Before your 13th birthday: did anyone- who was at least 5 years older than
you – touch or fondle your body in a sexual way or make you touch or
fondle their body in a sexual way?
i. Before your 13th birthday: Did anyone close to your age touch sexual parts
of your body or make you touch sexual parts of their body – against your
will or without your consent?
j. After your 13th birthday and before your 18th birthday: Did anyone touch
sexual parts of your body or make you touch sexual parts of their body –
against your will or without your consent?
th

k. After your 18 birthday: Did anyone touch sexual parts of your body or
make you touch sexual parts of their body – against your will or without
your consent?
l. Were you ever subjected to uninvited or unwanted sexual attention (other
than sexual contact discussed in previous questions)?
m. Has anyone ever stalked you – in other words: followed you or kept track of
your activities – causing you to feel intimidated or concerned for your
safety?
n. Have you ever experienced (or seen) any other events that were life
threatening, causing serious injury, or were highly disturbing or distressing?
(examples: lost in the wilderness; a serious animal bite, violent death of a
pet; being kidnapped or held hostage; seeing mutilated body or body parts)
4. You identified experiencing
___________________________________________________.
Which one was the most upsetting and when was the last time it occurred?
___________________________________________________________________
________ (not eligible if occurred before the age of 16 or less than 3 months ago)
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5. When might you be able to complete the first 30 minute survey?
_______________________
6. What is the email address you can receive the online study link?
_______________________
Part II scheduled (complete after Part I): _______(Date) ______ (Time) ________
(Location)
Prescreen completed by:
_________________________________________________________
Name
Date

Time
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To help us interpret the results of this survey, we would like to ask you a few general
questions:
1) Your current age ____
2) What is your sexual orientation (check one)?
[ ]
Heterosexual
[ ]
[ ]
Homosexual
[ ]
3) What is your ethnic background (check one)?
[ ]
Hispanic or Latino
[ ]
[ ]
Not Hispanic or Latino

Bisexual
Other
Unknown

4) What is your racial background (check one):
[ ]
Caucasian or White
[ ]
Native Hawaiin/other Pacific Islander
[ ]
African American
[ ]
Biracial
[ ]
Asian
[ ]
Unknown
[ ]
American Indian or Alaskan Native
5) What is your relationship status (check one)?
[ ]
Single
[ ]
[ ]
Dating
[ ]
[ ]
Living with partner
[ ]
[ ]
Married
[ ]
6) Your level of education (circle one):
[ ]
Grade school or less
[ ]
High school degree/GED
[ ]
College degree
[ ]
Graduate degree

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

Widowed
Divorced
Remarried
Separated
Some high school
Some college or vocational school
Some graduate school

7) What is your estimated household (family) income last year (check one)?
[ ]
$15,000 or less
[ ]
$35,001 - $50,000
[ ]
$15,001 - $25,000
[ ]
$50,001 or more
[ ]
$25,001 - $35,000
8) If you have ever been in therapy, what did you seek treatment for?
9) If you have ever been in therapy, how many years were you involved in treatment?
10) On a scale of 1 to 7, how successful would you consider your therapy experience?
[ ]
Not at all successful
[ ]
Extremely successful
[ ]
Somewhat successful
[ ]
Other (please
explain:_________________)
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The purpose of this questionnaire is to identify important life experiences that can affect a
person’s emotional well-being or later quality of life. The events listed below are far more
common than people realize. Please read each question carefully and mark the answers that
best describe your experience.
1. Have you ever experienced a natural disaster (a flood, hurricane, earthquake, etc.)?
never__

once__
twice__
more than 5 times__

3 times__

4 times__

5 times__

If this happened:
Did you experience intense fear, helplessness, or horror when it happened? yes/no
Were you seriously injured? yes/no
Was someone you cared about or close by seriously injured or killed? yes/no
Do you think you or a loved one was in danger of being killed by the disaster? yes/no
2. Were you involved in a motor vehicle accident for which you received medical attention
or that badly injured or killed someone?
never__

once__
twice__
more than 5 times__

3 times__

4 times__

5 times__

If this happened:
Did you experience intense fear, helplessness, or horror when it happened? yes/no
Were you seriously injured? yes/no
3. Have you been involved in any other kind of accident where you or someone else was
badly hurt?
(examples: a plane crash, a drowning or near drowning, an electrical or machinery accident,
an explosion, home fire, chemical leak, overexposure to radiation or toxic chemicals)
never__
once__
more than 5 times__

twice__

3 times__

4 times__

5 times__

If this happened:
Did you experience intense fear, helplessness, or horror when it happened? yes/no
Were you seriously injured? yes/no
4. Have you ever lived, worked, or had military service in a war zone? yes/no
If yes, were you ever exposed to warfare or combat? (for example: in the vicinity of a
rocket attack or people being fired upon; seeing someone get wounded or killed)
never__
once__
more than 5 times__

twice__

3 times__

4 times__

5 times__
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If this happened:
Did you experience intense fear, helplessness, or horror when it happened? yes/no
Were you seriously injured? yes/no
5. Have you ever experienced the sudden or unexpected death of a close friend or loved
one?
never__
once__
more than 5 times__

twice__

Due to accident? yes/no

illness? yes/no

3 times__

4 times__

5 times__

suicide? yes/no murder? yes/no

If his happened:
Did you experience intense fear, helplessness, or horror when it happened? yes/no
6. Has a loved one ever survived a life threatening or permanently disabling accident,
assault, or illness? (examples: spinal cord injury, rape, cancer, life threatening virus)
never__
once__
more than 5 times__

twice__

3 times__

4 times__

5 times__

If this happened:
Did you experience intense fear, helplessness, or horror when it happened? yes/no
7. Have you ever had a life threatening illness?
never__
once__
more than 5 times__

twice__

3 times__

4 times__

5 times__

If this happened:
Did you experience intense fear, helplessness, or horror when it happened? yes/no
8. Have you been robbed or been present during a robbery-where the robber(s) used or
displayed a weapon?
never__
once__
more than 5 times__

twice__

3 times__

4 times__

5 times__

If this happened:
Did you experience intense fear, helplessness, or horror when it happened? yes/no
Were you seriously injured? yes/no
9. Have you been hit or beaten up and badly hurt by a stranger or by someone you didn’t
know very well?
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never__
once__
more than 5 times__

twice__

3 times__

4 times__

5 times__

If this happened:
Did you experience intense fear, helplessness, or horror when it happened? yes/no
Were you seriously injured? yes/no
10. Have you seen a stranger (or someone you didn’t know very well) attack or beat up
someone and seriously injure or kill them?
never__
once__
more than 5 times__

twice__

3 times__

4 times__

5 times__

If this happened:
Did you experience intense fear, helplessness, or horror when it happened? yes/no
11. Has anyone threatened to kill you or cause you serious physical harm?
never__
once__
more than 5 times__

twice__

3 times__

stranger? yes/no
friend or acquaintance? yes/no
intimate partner? yes/no

4 times__

5 times__

relative? yes/no

If this happened:
Did you experience intense fear, helplessness, or horror when it happened? yes/no
12. While you were growing up: Were you physically punished in a way that resulted in
bruises, burns, cuts, or broken bones?
never__
once__
more than 5 times__

twice__

3 times__

4 times__

5 times___

If this happened:
Did you experience intense fear, helplessness, or horror when it happened? yes/no
13. While growing up: Did you see or hear family violence? (such as your father hitting
your mother, or any family member beating up or inflicting bruises, burns or cuts on
another family member)
never__
once__
more than 5 times__

twice__

3 times__

4 times__

5 times__

If this happened:
Did you experience intense fear, helplessness, or horror when it happened? yes/no
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14. Have you ever been slapped, punched, kicked, beaten up, or otherwise physically hurt
by your spouse (or former spouse), a boyfriend/girlfriend, or some other intimate partner?
never__
once__
more than 5 times__

twice__

3 times__

4 times__

5 times__

If this happened?
Did you experience intense fear, helplessness, or horror when it happened? yes/no
Were you seriously injured? yes/no
Has more than one intimate partner physically hurt you? yes/no
If yes, how many hurt you? _____
th

15. Before your 13 birthday: Did anyone – who was at least give years older than you –
touch or fondle your body in a sexual way or make you touch or fondle their body in a
sexual way?
never__
once__
more than 5 times__

twice__

3 times__

4 times__

5 times__

Was the person a stranger? yes/no
friend or acquaintance? yes/no
parent or
caregiver? yes/no
Other relative? yes/no
Was threat or force used? yes/no
Were you seriously injured? yes/no
Was there oral, anal, or vaginal penetration? yes/no
If this happened:
Did you experience intense fear, helplessness, or horror when it happened? yes/no
th

16. Before your 13 birthday: Did anyone close to your age touch sexual parts of your body
or make you touch sexual parts of their body against your will or without your consent?
never__
once__
more than 5 times__

twice__

3 times__

4 times__

Was the person a stranger? yes/no
friend or acquaintance? yes/no
yes/no
Was threat or force used? yes/no
Were you seriously injured? yes/no
Was there oral, anal, or vaginal penetration? yes/no

5 times__
relative?

If this happened:
Did you experience intense fear, helplessness, or horror when it happened? yes/no
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th

th

17. After your 13 birthday and before your 18 birthday: Did anyone touch sexual parts of
your body or make you touch sexual parts of their body – against your will or without your
consent?
never__
once__
more than 5 times__

twice__

3 times__

stranger? yes/no
friend or acquaintance? yes/no
partner? yes/no
Was threat or force used? yes/no
Were you seriously injured? yes/no
Was there oral, anal, or vaginal penetration? yes/no

4 times__

5 times__

relative? yes/no

intimate

If this happened:
Did you experience intense fear, helplessness, or horror when it happened? yes/no
th

18. After your 18 birthday: Did anyone touch sexual parts of your body or make you touch
sexual parts of their body – against your will or without your consent?
never__
once__
more than 5 times__

twice__

3 times__

stranger? yes/no
friend or acquaintance? yes/no
partner? yes/no
Was threat or force used? yes/no
Were you seriously injured? yes/no
Was there oral, anal, or vaginal penetration? yes/no

4 times__

5 times__

relative? yes/no

intimate

If this happened:
Did you experience intense fear, helplessness, or horror when it happened? yes/no
19. Were you ever subjected to uninvited or unwanted sexual attention (other than sexual
contact discussed in previous questions)?
never__
once__
more than 5 times__

twice__

3 times__

If yes, was this person a:
Stranger? Yes / No
Friend or acquaintance? Yes/No
Supervisor or coworker? Yes/No

4 times__

5 times__

Relative? Yes/ No

If this happened:
Did you experience intense fear, helplessness, or horror when it happened? yes/no
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20. Has anyone ever stalked you – in other words: followed you or kept track of your
activities – causing you to feel intimidated or concerned for your safety?
never__
once__
more than 5 times__
stranger? yes/no
partner? yes/no

twice__

3 times__

friend or acquaintance? yes/no

4 times__
relative? yes/no

5 times__
intimate

If this happened:
Did you experience intense fear, helplessness, or horror when it happened? yes/no
21. Have you or a romantic partner ever had a miscarriage?
never__
once__
more than 5 times__

twice__

3 times__

4 times__

5 times__

If this happened:
Did you experience intense fear, helplessness, or horror when it happened? yes/no
Did it (ever) happen after you were physically injured? yes/no
22. Have you or a romantic partner ever had an abortion?
never__
once__
more than 5 times__

twice__

3 times__

4 times__

5 times__

If this happened:
Did you experience intense fear, helplessness, or horror when it happened? yes/no
23. Have you ever experienced (or seen) any other events that were life threatening, causing
serious injury, or were highly disturbing or distressing? (examples: lost in the wilderness; a
serious animal bite, violent death of a pet; being kidnapped or held hostage; seeing
mutilated body or body parts)
never__
once__
more than 5 times__

twice__

3 times__

4 times__

5 times__

If this happened:
Did you experience intense fear, helplessness, or horror when it happened? yes/no
Were you seriously injured? yes/no

APPENDIX F
THE POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE AFFECT SCHEDULEEXPANDED VERSION (PANAS-X)

131
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read each
item and then list the number from the scale below next to each word. Indicate to what extent
you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment.

1. Cheerful
2. Disgusted
3. Attentive
4.Bashful
5. Sluggish
6. Daring
7. Surprised
8. Strong
9. Scornful
10. Relaxed
11. Irritable
12. Delighted
13. Inspired
14. Fearless
15. Disgusted with
Self
16. Sad
17. Calm
18. Afraid
19. Tired
20. Amazed
21. Shaky
22. Happy
23. Timid
24. Alone
25. Alert
26. Upset
27. Angry
28. Bold
29. Blue
30. Shy

Very Slightly
or Not at All
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

A Little

Moderately

Quite a Bit

Extremely

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
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31. Active
32. Guilty
33. Joyful
34. Nervous
35. Lonely
36. Sleepy
37. Excited
38. Hostile
39. Proud
40. Jittery
41. Lively
42. Ashamed
43. At ease
44. Scared
45. Drowsy
46. Angry at self
47. Enthusiastic
48. Downhearted
49. Sheepish
50. Distressed
51. Blameworthy
52. Determined
53. Frightened
54. Astonished
55. Interested
56. Loathing
57. Confident
58. Energetic
59. Concentrating
60. Dissatisfied with
self

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
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I would like you to spend the next 9 minutes writing on this blank page whatever information
is present in your awareness from moment to moment. Your report might include, but is not
limited to, descriptions of images, memories, feelings, fantasies, plans, sensations, observations,
daydreams, objects that catch your attention, or efforts to solve a problem. It is OK to think about
absolutely anything, including your traumatic experience. Do not worry about spelling or
grammar.
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
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Rationale: “We are interested in the thoughts that people have in response to some
scenarios. The focus of the experiment is on processes of imagination, visualization and
cognition in general. I am going to describe some scenarios to you and ask you to spend
some time concentrating on each one. Do you have any questions before we begin?”
Practice Task A – “Let’s start with a practice of the task we’ll be doing today.”
Analytic Instructions:
“Shortly, I will ask to think about an event, focusing on why it happened, and to
analyze the causes, meanings and implications of the event. In order to give you a
sense of this, let’s work through an example.”
Scenario Practice (friend in street): Think about walking down the street, and seeing a
close friend coming towards you. You smile and say hello, but your friend carries on past
without saying anything or acknowledging you. Focus on the causes, meanings and
implications of this event using the sort of verbal language you use when you speak or
when you are talking to yourself, or when you are thinking something over in your mind.
For example, a running commentary on what has happened and what it means.
[Give a moment or two]
“For example, say to yourself in your mind a question such as: ‘Why did this happen
to me?’... What verbal thought went through your mind or what did you say to
yourself when you asked yourself that question?”
“ASK YOURSELF ANOTHER QUESTION LIKE”
“What does this mean about me?”
“What does this mean about my friend?”
“Why did my friend ignore me?”
“What does my friend think about me?”
“What consequences might this have for our friendship?”
“What will happen next?”
[Give 1 minute to answer]
Manipulation Check: check for details and implications, sense of vagueness/generality
Rating for imagery/words: I would like you to rate, on a 0–100 scale, how much
you were focusing on the scenario as an image, that is a picture in your mind
where 0 = ‘not at all in images and 100 = ‘completely in images
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
__________________________________________________________________
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not at all images

completely images

I would like you to rate, on a 0–100 scale, how much you were focusing on the
scenario with words you say to yourself in your head, that is talking to yourself
where 0 = ‘not at all in words’ and 100 = ‘completely in words’
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
__________________________________________________________________
not at all words
completely words
“Ok so this is a good example of focusing on the causes, meanings and
implications of the event and I want you to carry on focusing like that for the
coming scenarios.”
Concrete Instructions:
“Shortly I will ask to think about an event, focusing on how it happened, and to
imagine in your mind as vividly and concretely as possible a ‘movie’ of how this
event unfolded. In order to give you a sense of this, let’s work through an example.”
Scenario Practice (sucking a lemon): Imagine you are in the grocery store. You are
standing next to the fruit stall and deciding what to buy. Focus on imagining that
scene in your mind’s eye as vividly as possible, as if you are actually there. Close
your eyes if that would help. Imagine that you are looking at a lemon; visualize the
lemon as vividly as possible.
[Give a moment or two]
“For example, notice the color... notice the shape... notice the texture of the lemon…
Describe how the lemon looks to you.” [description looking first person ”I”, present
tense, concrete details – if not getting involvement – dwell on that section].
“WHAT DETAILS CAN YOU SEE/NOTICE?”
Imagine yourself picking up the lemon, grasping the lemon, and holding it in your
nose.
Focus your attention on how the lemon feels... as vividly as possible… describe to me
how the lemon feels...
Now imagine holding the lemon to your nose… Notice how the lemon smells...
Describe how the lemon smells...
Imagine biting into the lemon.”
What was your experience?
[Give 1 minute to answer]
Manipulation Check: check for immediate response re unpleasantness, non-verbal
response – mouth watering, sensations, saliva.
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Rating for imagery/words: I would like you to rate, on a 0–100 scale, how much
you were focusing on the scenario as an image, that is a picture in your mind
where 0 = ‘not at all in images and 100 = ‘completely in images’
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
__________________________________________________________________
not at all images
completely images
I would like you to rate, on a 0–100 scale, how much you were focusing on the
scenario with words you say to yourself in your head, that is talking to yourself
where 0 = ‘not at all in words’ and 100 = ‘completely in words’
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
__________________________________________________________________
not at all words
completely words
“OK so this is a good example of focusing on and visually imagining in your mind as
vividly and concretely as possible a ‘movie’ of how an event unfolds and I want you
to carry on focusing like that for the coming scenarios”
Practice Task B: ‘’We’ll now do a practice of the task we’ll be doing today.”
1. Describe one practice scenario (read to participant)
2. Give instructions
3. Participant imagines scenario and writes answer for 1 minute
4. Clarify adherence to instructions and check that participant is in the right mode. If not
in the right mode, review practice scenario task instructions and repeat practice
Practice Scenario B: The last two weeks you notice that you have been feeling tired and worn
out. It seems as though you always have too much to do, leaving little time to relax and unwind.
Today, you struggle to get out of bed and get to work and find it really hard to concentrate. Your
boss asks you a question and you just go blank.
Abstract Instructions: “I would now like you to spend a minute concentrating on this
event. Specifically, I would like you to think about why it happened, and to analyze
the causes, meanings and implications of the event, as we just practiced.”
[Wait 1 minute]
“I would now like you to tell me what went through your mind during that minute.”
[Wait for initial response and if necessary, prompt with]:
Were you thinking about the causes and implications of the event? Can you tell me about
those?’
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Further prompts – “As best you can think about… the reasons for this event/the meaning
of this event/the causes of this event//the implications of this event.”
“What do you think the… the reasons for this event/the meaning of this event/the causes
of this event//the implications of this event… are?
[Check whether verbal, why questions, meaning, implications.
If not, then go over the example of the friend and questions, then repeat the boss
scenario.]
Feedback: “That’s good – this is exactly what I want you to do – to think
about the causes, meanings and implications of the event like you’ve just
done – this thinking about the causes, meanings and implications of the event
just like that is what I want you to carry on doing later when I ask you to
think about other examples.”
Concrete Instructions: “I would now like you to spend a minute concentrating on this
event. Specifically, I would like you to focus on how it happened, and to imagine in
your mind as vividly and concretely as possible a ‘movie’ of how this event unfolded,
as we just practiced.”
[Wait 1 minute]
“I would now like you to tell me what went through your mind during that minute.”
[Wait for initial response and if necessary, prompt with]:
“Were you picturing a scene? Can you describe it to me?”
Further prompts – “As best you can describe what you can see/what is happening/your
experience of the event/how the event happened/what happened next/ the concrete details
of the scene…”
[Check whether visual, how questions, pictorial description of event - detailed. Is it
generating a distinct visual image for you as a listener?
If not, then go over the example of the friend and questions, then repeat the boss
scenario]
Feedback: “That’s good – this is exactly what I want you to do –describing
the situation in concrete detail like this and imagining how things are
happening moment to moment and visualising the scene very clearly in your
mind like you’ve just done – this visualising of how the event unfolded just
like that is what I want you to carry on doing later when I ask you to focus
on other examples.”
Induction
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Abstract Instructions: “We will now begin today’s task. I am going to describe to you
a number of scenarios. As with the practice item, throughout this task I would like
you to spend a minute concentrating on each scenario. Specifically, I would like you
to think about why the event happened, and to analyze the causes, meanings and
implications of each event. Write your answers down on the blank paper provided.”
Concrete Instructions: “We will now begin today’s task. I am going to describe to you
a number of scenarios. As with the practice item, throughout this task I would like
you to spend a minute concentrating on each scenario. Specifically, I would like you
to focus on how the event happened, and to imagine in your mind as vividly and
concretely as possible a ‘movie’ of how each event unfolded. Write your answers
down on the blank paper provided”
Abstract Directions (repeat with each scenario): “I would now like you to spend a
minute concentrating on this event. Specifically, I would like you to think about why
it happened, and to analyze the causes, meanings and implications of the event.”
Concrete Directions (repeat with each scenario): “I would now like you to spend a
minute concentrating on this event. Specifically, I would like you to focus on how it
happened, and to imagine in your mind as vividly and concretely as possible a
‘movie’ of how the event unfolded.”
Set of Scenarios:
Over the past few months you have barely been able to meet your household expenses, as well as
make regular mortgage payments. Today you receive your credit card bill including your
expenses over Christmas, which are much larger than you planned for.
You go for a job interview. You are well prepared and able to answer the questions competently.
The interview panel is friendly and encouraging, and you leave feeling very confident that you
had performed well enough to secure the position.
You are about to give an important presentation at work that will summarize the project you have
been running for the past 12 months. It is very important that you make a good impression, as a
number of senior staff are present. You feel quite nervous, and you notice that as the presentation
continues, the audience is reacting negatively towards what you are saying.
Today you celebrated your birthday. Your best friend surprises you by arranging and preparing a
surprise dinner for your close friends. You are touched by their effort in going to so much trouble
on your behalf, and feel that they must truly value your friendship.
You have an argument with your best friend. You have only had a few minor disagreements in
the past, but this argument becomes heated and she tells you that she feels that she will never be
able to trust you again. You are shocked and hurt.
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A few months ago you bought some raffle tickets to help raise funds for local services in your
community. Today you receive an unexpected phone call, in which a lady informs you that you
had won first prize in the raffle, which was a week’s holiday to Spain for you and a friend.
You have arranged a weekend away with a group of four friends, and have been looking forward
to it for several months. The day before you are due to leave, two of the friends suddenly cancel
on you without giving a clear reason. On hearing this, the remaining friend then also tells you
that she would prefer not to come along.
You and your sister decided to take a course of sailing lessons. Today you had your first lesson.
You really enjoyed the chance to learn something new, as well as spend some quality time
outdoors with your sister.
You and your partner have spent the past year remodeling your house. Today you finished the
last job of painting the living room. The changes you have made look just the way you wanted
and you are really pleased with the result. You are confident that you will make a significant
profit when you sell the property.
Two of your closest friends have been abroad travelling over the past 12 months. You have
really missed their company, and they are due to arrive home today. You are going to pick them
up from the airport, and are feeling very excited about seeing them after such a long time.
You are attending a series of evening pottery classes. You were surprised and pleased when the
class instructor tells you that you have a natural talent, and encourages you to enter some of your
pieces in a competition at the local fair. In tonight’s class it is announced that you received first
prize in the competition for a vase that you made.
You have recently started a new job. Although you have tried very hard to be friendly and polite
to your new colleagues, they do not make any effort to include you in conversation. Today you
overhear them making arrangements to socialize after work, but they do not invite you along.
You have recently applied for a promotion. It is your annual work evaluation. You are called into
your boss’ office. He looks at your file for a few moments and then tells you that your request for
a promotion has been turned down.
You have recently started dating someone new. Today you went for a long walk together, and
spent several hours talking about the things that are important to you both. You feel a very strong
connection with this person, and enjoy discussing your many shared values and beliefs.
Your semester exams are scheduled for next week. You have been studying hard over the past
three months, and have prepared lots of revision notes on your computer. Today you logged on
to your computer to find that the hard drive had crashed, and all of your work is lost.
Your brother and sister recently had a serious argument over money. The situation remains
unresolved, and now other family members, including extended family, have become involved
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and taken sides in their disagreement. Today, your sister phones you up and is very distressed
and angry. She has a go at your brother and tries to find out whose side you are on. She wants
you to support her side of the argument. You feel trapped and in conflict.
The company you work for has recently experienced financial difficulties. Yesterday five of your
co-workers were unexpectedly fired. Today, your boss has called a sudden meeting with you and
your other team members. When you are all in his office, he begins to talk about how your team
needs to be streamlined and downgraded. You now feel that your own position is not secure.
Today is your college graduation ceremony. You enjoyed your classes and did well in college, so
you are looking forward to having your achievements recognized. You are also looking forward
to celebrating your graduation with your classmates, who you felt very supported by throughout
your time in college.
You have been in a long-term relationship for some time. Increasingly it has become clear that it
was not working and that your partner and you had different goals and plans for the future. You
have decided to end the relationship. Today, you sit down with your partner to tell them that it is
over. Your partner is upset and protests. It is very difficult for you, as you still have strong
feelings for your former partner.
Some new neighbors have moved in next door. Every night since they arrived they have had
people around visiting and have been playing loud music until the early hours of the morning.
During the day they have frequent arguments, and generally make lots of noise. This morning, at
3am, they have a loud argument with lots of shouting which wakes you up. You have had
enough. You tell them to be quiet. They get abusive towards you.
On the weekend you went on a long hike in the local national park. You had never hiked in this
park before, and found the scenery quite spectacular. You were particularly impressed with the
view from the top of the lookout, from where you could see the surrounding countryside for
miles.
You have a good relationship with your roommate at college. One day, unexpectedly, they tell
you that they have requested to switch to another room in the hall, but they do not give you a
reason for their decision. You feel puzzled and confused.
You have an 8am appointment in the city for a job interview. You wake up an hour late and
despite getting dressed frantically and rushing to the bus stop, you miss the bus. You will almost
certainly be late for the interview.
A cousin of yours is getting married today. Many of your relatives have travelled long distances
to come to the wedding, including some that you have not seen for many years. It will be great to
see your family together again to celebrate the occasion.
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Today you bought a new car – a very attractive convertible. You’ve worked hard to save over the
past five years in order to afford it, and you were able to buy a 2013 model. You see this
purchase as a significant achievement, and feel very proud as you drive the car home today.
Last week you arrived home from holidays to find that your house had been robbed. After
reporting the break-in to the police, you call your insurer to inform them of the incident and to
discuss lodging a claim. You were told that your insurance policy had lapsed, so you were not
covered for damages to your property, or for any of your stolen possessions.
You are in a road traffic accident. As you pull out into an intersection, a van smashes into the
side of your car, pushing you along the road. Your car is totaled. You are badly bruised and your
chest hurts. The fire department cut you out of the car and an ambulance takes you to hospital.
The doctor says that you have bad whiplash and several broken ribs.
Today you finished a project that you have been directing at work for the past year. Your team
celebrated over a lunch that was arranged by your boss. Your boss also gave a speech thanking
you for your commitment and praising the performance of the team. You feel satisfied and
valued by your boss.
You have decided to go travelling through Asia for six months. You are due to leave today, and
have finished packing and making all of your preparations. You have always wanted to visit that
part of the world, and feel very excited in anticipation of all of the experiences you will have.
Yesterday you were informed that you have been promoted at work. Although you have been
working hard and hoped that this would be acknowledged and rewarded in the long-term, you are
nevertheless a reasonably new member of staff, so you are surprised and delighted to be
promoted so soon.

APPENDIX I
CATASTROPHIZING INTERVIEW (CI)
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I will now ask you questions related to the most traumatic experience you identified during your
pre-screen. The event you identified was [index trauma]. Please answer each question in one
sentence. I’ll write down your responses as you say them. You can stop the interview when you
have sufficiently explored your concern about [index trauma]. Let’s begin.
What is it that concerns you most about the [index trauma]?
1.____________________________________________________________________________
2.____________________________________________________________________________
3.____________________________________________________________________________
4.____________________________________________________________________________
5.____________________________________________________________________________
6.____________________________________________________________________________
7.____________________________________________________________________________
Remember, you can end the interview when you have sufficiently explored your concern.
(Repeat after 7, 14, and 21 steps, etc.)
8.____________________________________________________________________________
9.____________________________________________________________________________
10.___________________________________________________________________________
11.___________________________________________________________________________
12.___________________________________________________________________________
13.___________________________________________________________________________
14.___________________________________________________________________________

APPENDIX J
INDUCTION OF POSITIVE MOOD STATE STORY
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Instructions: Below is a story rated as one of the most uplifting stories of 2011. This story is
intended to promote a positive mood in the reader. Please read the story while feeling positive.
Grandmother graduates college after 42 years
Thursday was the graduation day a Hamden grandmother has been looking forward to for 42
years.
Dora Anne Council, 76, was among the 870 graduates to receive their diplomas at Gateway
Community College Thursday night.
“They said, ‘Grandma, you’re one of a kind.’ But I’m not one of kind because all you have to do
is want something bad enough,” Council said...
In 1969, she first enrolled in what was then called South Central Community College. Shortly
after, she decided to put her education on hold to help support her family.
“I wanted to go to college when I was young, but I knew I couldn’t because I had to get a job,”
Council said. “I lucked out and got a job as a telephone operator and that was a good
accomplishment.”
Thirty years later, she decided it was time to go back to school, and she had the full support of
her family when she went back to what is now Gateway Community College.
“I told her, ‘Look mom, you want to go back. It’s your turn now,’” her son, Jimmy-Lee Moore,
said. “Hey, I have the money, I’ll pay for whatever you need. You let me know.”
On Thursday night, Council sat amongst her classmates, most of whom are around the same age
as her grandchildren.
“They think I’m so smart. I said, ‘I’m no smarter than you are,’” Council said. “The answers are
in the book.”
When Dora’s name was called out, there was a huge round of applause.
“It feels wonderful! Wonderful! Wonderful!” she exclaimed following graduation.
She received an associate degree in general studies.

